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Can American SWAT Units Handle Terrorists?

By Paul Copher, Jr.
At first glance, the answer may be a confident, “Yes!” But read the experience of one who’s been there.
Foreign terrorist organizations have exhibited a very real interest in the tactical capabilities of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Of particular concern to these potential “visitors” to America is the ability of a typical Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) team to counter, or even understand, a terrorist act.

In the world of special weapons and tactics units, as with cars, movies and restaurants, one can find very good models…and some horrible examples. That’s true whether abroad, or in the U.S. When I flew foreign carriers in the Mid-east I used to fear not so much a potential hijacking as a possible rescue by a unit like the Egyptian commandos! (To be fair, the Egyptians have really improved their capabilities, but only after they carried off several disastrous operations. It takes time and lives, but units greatly improve.)

Learning from the mistakes and successes of others, whether in the U.S. or abroad, will reduce the time and the cost in lives. But before comparing units outside the U.S. with American teams, and before slavishly adopting foreign tactics and strategies, it is important to remember there are differences in operating environments.

Many people are unaware that there are major differences in the way SWAT operations are perceived at home and abroad. These variations are important to understand when evaluating the potential of “armed propaganda units” against special weapons and tactics forces.

In the U.S., if a police unit is forced to kill or wound a suspect, it makes the evening news. If a unit is able to negotiate a situation and get a peaceful resolution, it often goes unnoticed. There is a critical, at times hostile, media and public that the SWAT team must eventually answer to in the U.S. Especially if they fail. In Europe and other parts of the world, these specialized units and their operations are highly publicized and romanticized by the press. In the popular mind they can do no wrong, barring the most egregious misstep. That makes a confrontation between a special unit and a terrorist force a propaganda “win” for the government no matter how disastrous the outcome.

Unlike in the U.S., there are no sensationalized public postmortems of special operations in most other countries. A foreign SWAT unit operates in an atmosphere of approval. Its members feel secure that honest mistakes won’t become a sort of scarlet letter. That sense of confidence affects operations. Only in America will you find “SWAT” linked to the image of death squads or killer cops in black. So pervasive is the feeling that some U.S. communities are loathed to even to call their officers SWAT. They refer to Emergency Action Teams, Tactical Operations Forces, Response Teams, and so on. That perception, too, has an effect on operations.

WHAT’S IN THE NAME? JURISDICTION?

Whatever the name, SWAT boils down to a group of men and women, who meet a real or potential threat to people and facilities under their jurisdiction. A hallmark of officers’ dedication is that many of these units are required to practice and train on their own time.

A major problem everywhere, one that even the best-trained and equipped units have seldom resolved is: who actually has jurisdiction in a major case? In the U.S. the local police, or the security police, if it is on a military reservation, will probably be the first to arrive on the scene, and they will therefore, be the first to make contact with terrorists.

Then the problem starts! Anyone else who can respond will try to do so: State Police, Sheriff, FBI, State Department, FAA, and National Guard.

All locations differ slightly in who has sole, joint or contiguous jurisdiction. It’s a safe bet that someone from every agency, which has the slightest pretense to a claim of jurisdiction will try to assume command and run the show. And I do mean show! Careers can be made from participation in such an operation if it goes well. No one will miss such a golden opportunity for self-advancement. The scramble for a piece of the action can reach ludicrous and dangerous levels.

Once, while living overseas, I was called to advise the Turkish National Police when the Egyptian Embassy was taken over by the Red Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, a Palestinian terrorist group. From what I could see, more than 20 high-ranking individuals arrived and tried to assume command of the 2000-plus TNP officers who responded to the takeover.

These individuals were followed by representatives of countless other Turkish agencies and military units who all thought they were in command. This scene would have been funny in the eyes of an American, if it had not been so serious. Fistfights broke out. Officers began pointing weapons at one another. Total confusion reigned.

Believe it or not, the terrorists finally fired shots in the air to restore some sense of order among the security personnel! This scene, to a lesser extent, has occurred in the U.S. among the various command structures. It is almost inevitable that it will repeat itself.

Typically, in the U.S., a local police agency will arrive first on the scene. The county or state police and the FBI will soon follow. All commanders will try to assume control over all the in-place personnel and units. The FBI will, of course, try to get its own SWAT unit on the scene. Often it has to be flown from the closest regional center, and it may be several hours before the FBI team arrives and, in the interim, the local, county and state police will be handling the situation by setting up perimeters, crowd and media control, and establishing first contact.

The locals may have a good negotiator. Even if they don’t, they have made first contact! The terrorists may well prefer to continue talking with that individual. This causes problems with the agencies that arrive later to assume command. They want their own men to negotiate.

Foreign terrorists have been taught that in the U.S. the FBI will be involved in the negotiations. The FBI has a good reputation abroad; it is feared by foreign groups, mainly because of the image created by TV and movies. So, to diminish FBI control, the groups try to begin negotiations with the first police officers on the scene who make initial contact. The terrorists will later insist that all negotiations be handled through the local police officer and not with the late-arriving FBI. I have personally heard this from a former terrorist.

While teaching at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), I would use this ploy as the basis for a scenario and have the role players demand to “talk to the first guy” rather than the assigned (and trained) negotiator. In training drills, as in real life, this causes a rift in the structure, as the agency in charge tries to speak through some other agency’s officer. Regardless of who is in charge, or where and when the decision is made as to who has overall jurisdiction, the major question for SWAT commanders to pose to any other units on the scene is: Are your people ready? The standard official police department answer is usually “Yes!”

All too often the more realistic answer is usually “No!” If an incident occurred as you read this Security Intelligence Sourcebook, could you quickly find officers within your department who speak Arabic, Farsi, Vietnamese or any of a hundred other languages? Do your officers have knowledge of the culture of immigrant or ethnic groups in the local community whom they may be dealing with? If not among officers within your department, do your files list local people who could serve as volunteer advisors? One example of not understanding cultures: When a Middle Easterner asks for food, the negotiator does not send in a ham sandwich, which has been done!

Lately there have been incidents with Middle Eastern and Vietnamese individuals holding hostages. A key problem reported by the agencies involved was that their officers could not carry on negotiations in the language of the hostage-takers. Nor did the officers understand the cultural differences. To top it all, some of the officers seemed to think, for reasons noted, that some other vaguely-perceived agency would come in and take over for them. They felt they were just marking time; they were not as concerned about negotiations as they should have been.

Several years ago, I was asked to come up with a few terrorist scenarios for the security police team of an Air Force base. Our special agents worked with the SP chief and we actually took over a base building. Our “terrorists” insisted on negotiating in Arabic. They began to “shoot” hostages every hour until they were contacted and offered a deal.

In this exercise terrorists “shot” one hostage and released another, who carried a message to the police that they would execute one hostage each hour until they were contacted by an Arabic speaker. After several hours of silence, the terrorists released another hostage who carried a new message: They wanted to talk about U.S. military aid to Israel and make these views known to the American press. Still they received no response.

The exercise was called off when it was discovered the police could not find, nor did they know how to find, an Arabic speaker. Nor did their officers have an understanding of the problems and history of the Mideast beyond knowing that “terrorists came from there.” Their answer to our “terrorist” demands was, “we don’t know much about the problems over there!”

At the debriefing we also found out that, while our released hostages were full of details on terrorist weapons, number of hostages and their locations, the police did not question the released hostages fully. Strangely, the security officers were more concerned with getting the hostages to a hospital than collecting vital intelligence data on the hostage-takers.

“THAT’S NOT FAIR!”

In the later debriefing, our group of simulated terrorists was accused of not playing fair, of shooting hostages without “cause!” After everyone had had their say at the debriefing, I pointed out that the exercise was successful if they learned that a terrorist cannot be treated like a drunken husband holding his wife hostage. Sometimes the theory of “contain and control” isn’t enough. When local police deal with a man holding his wife hostage, the normal course is to tell the man not to act irrationally, that you know what he is feeling, that so far no one has been hurt, and to call on him to end the situation. Those are proven methods, but not in terrorism situations.

Tell a terrorist that you know how he/she feels and you may well be interrogated on the spot to prove it. If you do not know the answers, terrorists might not negotiate any longer; or they may shoot at you or kill a hostage.

I have found that terrorists will talk about their goals and causes. Why not let them? I have seen local police officers overseas handle a situation very well by asking the terrorists to talk about why they are holding people, why they are violent, what they hope to gain. The local officer knew how to talk to, and not at, the subjects.

The exercise at the Air Force base also proved it is important to train your SWAT officers in fields other than weapons and tactics. If you want to learn from someone else’s mistake, remember that if you do not have an Arabic speaker available, at least have an idea where one can be found. Have the department pay for your officers to take classes on the history and culture of various regions. Try to make your own people into area specialists. Have them become knowledgeable about world affairs and conflicts.

The best-prepared SWAT team will have its own analysis center and have the members of that specialist group work with, and serve, the negotiator. It is important to get out of the mind set of depending on others for analysis. The specialists can teach the SWAT unit. Qualified outside speakers can also be brought in for training sessions. Look for people in your area. People with expertise are ready to help, but they have to be asked.

One important caveat is in order. Make certain you get qualified experts. I once listened to an American psychologist/hostage negotiator tell an interviewer about the mind of a Shiite terrorist. This man had no experience in the Mideast, lacked any training in cross-cultural communications, and was trying to apply his American values to the Islamic act of jihad and kidnapping. He was saying just enough to get someone killed if his rationale had been applied by police in a hostage situation. Thus far I’ve mentioned “traditional” terrorism as if that is the only threat which has to be considered and studied. I use traditional terrorists only as an example. Consider non-Arabic threats. What about White Supremacist or Environmentalist takeovers or siege situations? What do your officers know about religious cults, identity sects, or Satanism? Do they know the issues, and each side of a question, in these areas? What are the goals of the IRA and the Puerto Rican Macheteros? If your local special tactics units don’t know the answers to such questions, and don’t know where to find out, you are not completely prepared.

Terrorists are often violent, deadly and will not always act as you predict. Are American police SWAT teams ready to meet the threat?

If your only goal in dealing with terrorists is to kill them by sniping, most U.S. SWAT teams could handle that job well. But could your SWAT team deal with a volatile situation and have nobody get killed?

What do you really think?

Paul Copher, Jr. is a Cultural Specialist with expertise in counterintelligence and terrorism. He was a liaison to
Turkish National Police and INTERPOL, and has spent time in numerous foreign countries. Paul Copher, Jr. is now a private instructor in Terrorism, Area Studies, Cross Cultural Communication, Personal Protection and Counterintelligence. He can be reached at email: PaulC76504@aol.com.