Congressional Quarterly
Statement of David C. Maurer Acting Director Natural Resources and Environment United States Government Accountability Office
Committee on Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
According to our preliminary work to date, DNDO has taken steps to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, but it lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture. Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial architecture after coordinating with, among others, DOD, DOE, and State, to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological material. Many of these programs predate the establishment of DNDO.
These programs cover all of the layers of detection, including securing special nuclear and radiological materials at their source in foreign countries and in the United States as well as detecting these materials at U.S. borders or within the United States. DNDO has also collaborated with other federal agencies, such as DOD, DOE, and State, to (1) identify gaps in the initial architecture, such as land borders between ports of entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation, and (2) develop programs to address these gaps.
For example, DNDO has a joint project underway with the Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Border Patrol to assess the feasibility of equipping border patrol agents with portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment along the U.S. border. Although these efforts to address recognized gaps in the architecture are necessary first steps, DNDO has not developed an overarching strategic plan that will guide its transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture.
Such a plan would define across the entire architecture how, for example, DNDO will achieve its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between ports of entry. This plan would also define the steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals, such as enhancing detection along borders.
DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, technological, and management challenges in developing a more comprehensive detection architecture. First, prior GAO reports have demonstrated that critical, long-standing U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas-which are a critical component of the architecture-have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have not been effectively coordinated.
Although coordination among the agencies has improved, as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, challenges in any of the programs that constitute the architecture may ultimately limit its overall effectiveness. Second, detection technology has limitations and is currently unable to detect and identify all smuggled radiological and nuclear materials.
For example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield radiological materials so that it evades detection. In addition, we have previously raised concerns about DNDO’s efforts to develop a new generation of radiation detection equipment. Furthermore, while radiation detection equipment is an important part of the architecture, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that also includes proper training and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations.
Third, DNDO faces challenges in managing the implementation of the architecture. DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture that is dependent on programs implemented by other agencies. Ensuring that these individual programs within the architecture are effectively integrated poses a challenge for DNDO. In addition, the majority of the employees in DNDO’s architecture office are on detail from other federal agencies or are contractors.
While this staffing approach taps expertise across several agencies, detailees return to their home organizations after a relatively short time and in some cases there have been delays in filling these vacancies. As a result, this turnover may limit the retention and depth of institutional memory.
According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, approximately $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs designed to combat nuclear smuggling and secure materials internationally.
Approximately $220 million was devoted to programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; and an additional $900 million funded security and detection activities within the United States.
Finally, approximately $575 million was used to fund a number of crosscutting activities that support many different layers of the architecture, such as those focused on research and development or technical support to users of the detection equipment.
In addition to these programs, DNDO and other federal agencies are pursuing future initiatives to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture. The costs to implement and sustain these and other future programs and equipment are not yet known or included in these figures. We are in the process of reviewing this cost information and will provide more detailed analysis in our final report.
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