NOTE: This article reprinted with permission from Alameda County District Attorney’s Office.
Patrol officers are often dispatched to investigate a report from a telephone caller of a possible crime in progress or other suspicious circumstance. Examples include reports of suspected drug dealing or gang activity on a street corner, or possible casing for a burglary or robbery.
If officers observe a person or car matching the description furnished by the caller, they may want to detain the person or make a car stop. It is sometimes assumed the law permits such action simply because the officers were responding to a report that was transmitted through official police channels. This is not true.
A detention or car stop based solely on a phone tip to the police is permitted if, (1) the caller furnished specific information that reasonably indicated the detainee was involved in criminal activity or at least his conduct was consistent with criminal activity; and (2) there was a reason to believe the caller or his information was reliable. As the United States Supreme Court explained, “Reasonable suspicion [to detain] is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” 5
The question arises: How can officers and prosecutors prove that information from a caller was sufficiently reliable to justify a detention? As we will now discuss, it depends on whether the caller was a citizen caller or an anonymous caller.
Information from a “citizen caller” is presumed reliable if it reasonably appears the information was based on the caller’s personal knowledge, not rumor, hearsay or other dubious sources.
A person will usually be deemed a citizen caller if, (1) the caller was the victim of the crime being reported or an eyewitness to a crime or suspected criminal activity, and (2) the caller identified himself to the police operator or law enforcement officer.4
1 See United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 US 1, 10; United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 US 411, 417-9; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 888, 893-4; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230-3; People v. Brown (1990) 216 Cal.App.13d 1442, 1448-9; People v. Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608,1613; People v. Green (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1107, 111; People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 524, 531-2; People v. Daugherty (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 275, 287.
2 Alabama v. White (1990) 496 US 325, 330. Also see People v. Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1614; People v. Superior Court (McBride) (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 156, 164.
3 See People v. Kershaw (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 750, 754; Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418, 421-2; People v. Shulle (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 809, 814.
4 See People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 263,268-9; People v. Shulle (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 809,814; People v. Lombera (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 29, 32; Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 US143,147.
A person might also be deemed a citizen caller if he or she was relaying information from the victim or eyewitness. In such cases, however, it is likely the information would be presumed reliable only if the identity of the caller and the victim or eyewitness was known to the operator, or there were other circumstances that reasonably indicated the information was reliable.5
For example, it is doubtful that information would be presumed reliable if a named caller was merely relaying information from a stranger who had left the scene. On the other hand, it would seem reasonable to rely on information from an unnamed crime victim who was still on the scene or whose whereabouts were known to the caller.
Keep in mind it is essential that the caller identify himself in order to be deemed a citizen caller. This is because the presumption of reliability is based mainly on the fact the caller knew he might face criminal prosecution if it turned out he intentionally furnished false information to the police.6
This does not mean the caller’s name must be broadcast to the responding officers.7 But they should be notified that the information was furnished by a named caller so they will know that their options may include detaining a suspect based solely on the caller’s information.
ANONYMOUS CALLERS
Information from a caller who does not identify himself is presumed to be unreliable. Consequently, officers may not detain a suspect based on such information unless they have additional information that makes it reasonable to rely on the caller’s tip. As the United States Supreme Court observed, “Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”8
As we will now discuss, there are several ways of establishing the reliability of such information.
CORROBORATION
The most common method of establishing the reliability of a tip from an anonymous caller is to corroborate or verify that some of the caller’s information is accurate, thereby making it reasonable to believe the rest of it is accurate, at least for the purposes of making a detention.9
The same rationale is employed by officers who write search warrant affidavits when they are relying on information from untested informants. In case of detentions, however, not as much corroboration is required because reasonable suspicion to detain is a lower standard of proof than probable cause to search or arrest. As the United States Supreme Court explained, “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. [R]easonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”10
Although there are no hard and fast rules for determining how much or what kind of corroboration will justify a detention based on an anonymous call, the following principles are often considered by the courts and may therefore be helpful.
5 See People v. Kershaw (1993) 147 Cal.App.3d 750, 754-5.
6 See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 233-4; People v. Kershaw (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d. 750, 755-6.
7 NOTE: The same rationale applies in search warrant cases where the important thing is not whether the name of a citizen informant was included in the affidavit, but whether the informant’s name was, in fact, known to the officers. See People v. Terrones (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d. 139, 147-8; People v. Kershaw (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 750, 757.
8 Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 US 143, 147. Also see People v. Superior Court (McBride) (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 156, 164.
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY
An anonymous tip may justify a detention if officers saw the detainee engage in conduct that was consistent with the type of criminal activity reported by the caller. According to the Court of Appeal, “Even observations of seemingly innocent activity suffice alone, as corroboration, if the anonymous tip casts the activity in a suspicious light.”11
For example, in People v.Avalos12 an untested informant13 reported to Anaheim police that several people were using a certain apartment in a methamphetamine operation. The informant also furnished officers with physical descriptions of the people involved. Officers staked out the apartment and saw Avalos arrive in a pickup truck, scan the area, then walk inside the apartment. Avalos fit the description of one of the occupants. Later, he drove to a storage business and carried a box into one of the units. He was then detained.
The court ruled the detention was justified because the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated. Said the court, “The police were told the apartment had been used for the sale and transportation of drugs…[Avalos] fit the description of a person the informant said was involved in the narcotics activity. [Avalos] scouted the area before entering the apartment. He left after only a few minutes carrying a box and proceeded to a storage unit where police saw him place another box in his truck. While the police may not have been able to arrest a defendant based on this information, it did authorize them to detain him temporarily.
9 See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 244; Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 US 143, 148.
10 Alabama v. White (1990) 496 US 325, 330. Also see Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 US 143, 147; People v. Johnson (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1, 10-11.
11 People v. Costello (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 431, 446. Also see Massachusetts v. Upton (1984) 466 US 727, 734; People v. Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1616.
12 (1996 47 Cal.App.4th 1569. Also see People v. Stamper (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 301, 305
13 NOTE: Although the informant had previously furnished accurate information, the court assumed, for purposes of its decision, that the informant was untested. At p. 1580.
Similarly, in People v. Johnson 14 two SFPD officers were dispatched to investigate an anonymous report that “someone was selling drugs or doing drugs” in the hallway of a certain apartment building through an unlocked front door and started walking up a darkened stairway.
As the officers reached the second floor landing, they saw Johnson “crouched over” on the steps leading to the third floor. At this point, Johnson stood up but did not say anything. One of the officers repeatedly said, “Come down toward me,” but Johnson did not respond. Suddenly, he put something in his mouth and ran up the stairs. The officers detained him and found rock cocaine in his mouth.
The court upheld the detention, ruling the anonymous caller’s tip had been sufficiently corroborated. Among other things the court noted, “the dark hallway plus the defendant’s odd position and mute demeanor could reasonably suggest to an officer experienced in rock cocaine arrests that criminal activity may be afoot…Suspicion was heightened by [the officer’s] personal experiences, from the past arrests in the area, that rock cocaine use was prevalent there. The defendant’s complete lack of response after standing up, and his staring as [the officer] asked him repeatedly to come down, added suspicion to an already bizarre encounter.”
In some cases, corroboration of information from anonymous callers has been found sufficient even though the corroborated circumstances were not at all suspicious. For example, in People v. Orozco15, officers were dispatched to an anonymous report of “shots being fired out of a cream, vinyl top over cream colored vehicle in the area of Phillips and East End. Occupants were several Mexicans.” When the officers arrived, they found a car matching that description and detained the occupants who “appeared to be Mexican.” In ruling the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated, the court stated, “When [the officers] arrived at the location they found everything to be as described over the broadcast. It was reasonable for them to believe that the occupants of the vehicle were in possession of a firearm.”
Similarly, in People v. Ramirez16, an anonymous caller notified San Diego police that three Hispanic males were selling drugs from their car on the east side of Golden Hill Park. Officers were aware that the park “was a very proliferate area for narcotics.” When they arrived a few minutes later, they spotted the parked car and detained the three occupants.
14 (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1.
15 (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 435. Also see People v. Johnson (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1320
16 (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608.
In ruling the detention was lawful, the court cited the following circumstances: (1) the caller’s description of the car, its occupants, and its location were corroborated, (2) the car was located in a high drug area, (3) “the activity that the men were engaged in, conversing in the car, was consistent with the informationin the tip (dealing drugs from that car), even though not innately suspicions in and of itself,” and (4) “some exigency existed because of the report of a crime in progress.”
In our opinion, however, Orozco and Ramirez are very close cases that could easily have resulted in reversals. Consequently, in situations where the corroborated circumstances do not suggest criminal activity it would be better, if possible, to attempt to “contact” the occupants or conduct surveillance and watch for conduct or other indications that would tend to corroborate the caller’s tip.
PREDICTING FUTURE CONDUCT
If the anonymous caller accurately predicted the suspect would engage in certain conduct related to his criminal activities in the near future or at a certain time, it may be reasonable to believe the remainder of the caller’s information is accurate. This is true even if the suspect’s conduct was not inherently suspicious.
For example, in Alabama v. White17, an anonymous caller notified police of the following: White would be leaving a certain apartment at a particular time; she would be carrying an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache case; she would get into a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken taillight; she would then drive to Dobey’s Motel.
At the appointed time, White left the apartment, got into the described station wagon and drove off. She was not, however, carrying an attache case. She then drove along the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel. Before she arrived at the motel, officers stopped the car, detained her and obtained consent to search the vehicle. During the search, officers found an attache case that contained marijuana.
The Court ruled the stop was lawful because it reasonably appeared the caller’s information was reliable. “What was important,” said the Court, “was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information – a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs…When significant aspects of the caller’s predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.”
17 (1990) 496 US 325. Also see Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213.
SELF-VERIFYING DETAIL
The courts have occasionally indicated that the reliability of information from an anonymous or untested informant might be established if the informant furnished a sufficiently large number of details about the suspect and/or the suspect’s activities to warrant the conclusion that the informant had access to inside – and therefore accurate – information.18 As the Court of Appeal observed, “some information is so detailed as to be self-verifying.”19
Accordingly, it is usually a good idea for officers and operators who are obtaining information from a caller who insists on anonymity to obtain as much detail as is practical under the circumstances, especially considering the seriousness of the crime.
MULTIPLE ANONYMOUS SOURCES
It is possible that information from an anonymous caller may be deemed sufficiently reliable to justify a detention if the same information, or essentially the same information, was received from another anonymous caller or multiple anonymous callers.
Although the courts have not ruled directly on this issue, they have addressed it in the context of search warrants where information supplied by two or more untested informants may be deemed sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to search if there was reason to believe the informants were truly independent of one another.20 As the Court of Appeal has noted, “The fact that two apparently unassociated persons make the same assertion increases the probability that it is true.”21
The problem, of course, is proving that multiple anonymous callers were, in fact, independent of one another. For purposes of establishing grounds to detain, it might be sufficient that the calls came from different phones as determined by CALLER ID or through an Automatic Location Indicator (ALI) on a 9-1-1 phone system, or that the voices of the callers appeared to be different. If so, responding officers should be notified so they will know there is some indication the information is reliable.
18 See People v. Johnson (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 742, 749; People v. Maestas (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1208, 1220, fn. 6.
19 People v. Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1617.
20 See People v. Sheridan (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 483, 489; People v. Aho (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 984, 991-2; People v.Green (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 199, 205-6; In re Christopher R. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 901, 905; Higgason v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 929, 938-9.
21 People v. Terrones (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 139, 147.