Tragic Death of Deputy in Kansas Emphasizes Importance of Proper Tactical Procedure
A multi-jurisdictional Emergency Response Team in Kansas, trying to rescue a woman who allegedly was being beaten by her boyfriend, met with a tragic fluke over the weekend that necessitated another type of rescue - the extraction of two downed officers from a hot crime scene.
According to reports, the team entered the house where the beating was underway in the small town of Newton, believing that the woman’s life was in immediate danger. The team was stacked directly in line behind an officer with a large ballistic shield.
At the moment they entered the living room, the woman broke free of her assailant and ran for the door. She collided with the officer holding the shield, knocking him away from the stacked line. The stack “began to break down,” authorities said.
Wielding a gun, the boyfriend then opened fire. Two officers in the stack were hit. One, Dep. Kurt Ford of the Harvey County Sheriff’s Department, was fatally wounded. The other, Det. Chris Eilert from the police department in nearby Hesston, was critically injured.
Both then had to be rescued, which the team accomplished without further injuries. The accused assailant eventually surrendered after a barricaded standoff.
Related Article: Kansas Deputy Killed Responding to Dispute; Suspect in Custody
15 Seconds to Safety
Tactics for rescuing one or more downed officers were outlined at the most recent conference of the American Society for Law Enforcement Training by Officers Robert Pippen and Tracy Chamberlin of the Portland, Ore. Police Bureau’s Training Division. Pippen elaborated on their presentation, “Street-Level Officer Rescues,” in an interview with Police1.
In the wake of the deadly encounter in Newton, this report is a timely one.
The procedure, Pippen explains, “has been used in Portland by street officers and tactical people, drug and vice cops-everyone is taught this,” he says. “At many departments this kind of information is never shared with patrol officers.”
The rescue is flexible enough it can be effective with a minimum of two officers besides the wounded one(s). “The process is deliberately kept simple so it’s easy to learn and do,” Pippen says. “Often a downed officer can be rescued in less than 15 seconds.”
When a crisis like this hits, “immediately your mission changes,” Pippen says. Now your overriding priority is to rescue the downed officer.”
The first step is to yell out “Officer down!” the instant the casualty is known. “Not all the team may be looking at the target officer when the hit occurs, Pippen explains, “so everyone needs to be alerted. This is especially important if officers are separated.”
Once alerted, officers quickly fill key rescue positions and begin their strategic collaboration to get their wounded teammate to a safe, protected location where medical personnel can respond ASAP. “Hard cover and distance is the best combination,” Pippen says, “but cover is the most important consideration. Find the nearest hard cover that’s available. Unless medics are SWAT-trained, most won’t enter a hot area.”
The positions to be filled are: cover-fire officer, drag officer and, optionally, lead-out officer. Where extra troops are available, they can supplement any of these roles.
Cover Fire
This “very gutsy” position is the first filled. Operating without personal cover if necessary, the cover-fire officer moves forward about two to three feet from the wounded officer and puts himself between the threat and his downed teammate. This creates workspace for other team members and permits the cover-fire officer a broad muzzle sweep without jeopardizing them. Firing rounds toward the location of the threat, his job is to keep the assailant pinned down and unwilling to shoot back.
“He needs to keep in mind the amount of ammo he has and to control his rate of fire,” Pippen cautions, “because a magazine can empty fast, especially under stress. Initially he may have to put three or four rounds out to get a suspect to hole up, but then one shot about every second-a sustained, steady rate of fire-may be enough to discourage return fire.”
If there are multiple assailants and manpower is available, two cover-fire officers can provide a bifurcated defense.
If a cover-fire officer can’t target the assailant precisely, Pippen recommends shooting at door jambs, the floor, over the suspect’s likely hiding place or other indirect choices, depending on the environment. “Try to shoot at something strong enough to stop rounds,” he suggests, to reduce the risk of collateral damage. “You are still responsible for every round you fire, and you have to articulate why you shot.” Agency policy should address cover fire, Pippen believes. “Officers hesitate to do something if there is no policy to establish guidelines.”
Drag
If help is limited, the drag officer has to be thinking, I’m the only one who’s going to pull this officer out and save his life.
To do so successfully requires proper positioning of the downed officer. Kneeling or squatting, the drag officer rolls him onto his back, sits him up and supports his back with the shin of one leg. He then sticks his arms under the downed officer’s arms, grabs his wrists with an overhand motion and pulls them up to breast level.
When the drag officer stands up, keeping his back straight to avoid straining it, the downed officer is raised enough off the floor or ground that his butt clears it. The rescuing officer then starts cautiously moving backward, using sliding steps that keep both feet against the surface, pulling his wounded teammate toward safety.
“This is a very secure position, much more effective than just grabbing a handful of uniform,” Pippen says. “In our training, the smallest officer is easily able to drag the biggest. You’re using your strength to pull rather than lift. Of course, you’re likely to have a good shot of adrenalin going for you too.”
If the drag officer wants help and an extra officer is available, he can assist. The drag officer should be standing, holding the wounded officer, before the assisting officer steps in. Stepping between the wounded officer’s legs, the assisting officer cups his hands under the ankles and lifts up. He needs to keep the ankles below the wounded officer’s rear end so avoid butt scrape. The two rescuing officers should face the same direction, with the officer carrying the feet leading the way out for best visibility and least likelihood of stumbling.
If more than one officer is down, as was the case in the Newton shooting, the drag will need to be repeated. A quick triage assessment will be necessary to determine which officer should be removed first.
Lead-Out
This role is filled only if manpower permits. Its purpose is to lead the cover-fire officer out of the scene. If there’s no one to serve as a lead-out officer or if the drag officer needs the help of any extra teammate, then the cover-fire officer must exit on his own, moving backward and continuing his barrage of suppressive fire until he is safe.
Otherwise, the lead-out officer first holsters his sidearm, then from behind he clutches the cover-fire officer’s duty belt and rear waistband with his off hand. “Do not try to grab his shoulder or his shirt,” Pippen cautions, “because that is more likely to destabilize his shooting platform.
“Keep your head up, look in the direction you want to go, turn your hips accordingly and start to move, watching where you’re headed to lessen the chance of tripping or stumbling. The cover-fire officer will follow your pressure tugging him. He will have to move backward so he can continue to monitor and fire at his area of responsibility. So you should warn him of what’s ahead underfoot. Keep your pulling arm bent, so your forearm is against his back, to better regulate your speed.”
Sometimes en route to safety, the cover-fire officer gets in trouble-his weapon malfunctions or he exhausts all his ammo-and he becomes useless in his role. At that point, he and the lead-out officer should switch positions.
This starts with the cover-fire officer yelling, “Switch!” (He should not give an explanation. It would not be wise to shout that he’s out of ammunition, for example, lest this become a cue for the offender to start attacking again.)
Responding with “Switching!”, the lead-out officer comes up beside the cover-fire officer and starts firing at the targeted area. While they are side by side, the cover-fire officer corrects his problem, in possible, keeping his muzzle downrange in the process so as not to telegraph a malfunction. If he gets back in action effectively, they can resume their original roles.
If not, the cover-fire officer holsters his weapon, moves behind the lead-out officer and takes responsibility for directing him to safety.
“Once everyone reaches a safe place, do a head count,” Pippen advises. “Also check yourself out to be sure you’re ok. You may have been hit and not know it. Check on the welfare of the others, too.”
In Pippen’s opinion, every agency, regardless of size, should have an officer-rescue plan. “If you’re in a small department, you can work out multi-jurisdictional tactics. Even if it’s very basic, a plan is paramount. It will save reaction time and lives in a crisis.”
Use in-service and roll-call training to reinforce the plan “so officers understand exactly what they need to know and do before they are in a crisis situation and their analytic powers are diminished by stress overload.” Practice the tactics on a regular basis. “Yes, it’s labor intensive and time intensive,” Pippen admits, “but we have a responsibility to practice our perishable skills both physically and mentally through tactical visualization. We owe it to ourselves and the people we work with.”
