Those of us who date our start in law enforcement to the 1970s have seen many dramatic changes in the profession. In the 1970s, very few officers had a college degree but nowadays it seems that most have some type of higher education. It was not very long ago that nearly everyone carried a revolver but the semi-automatic has become nearly ubiquitous on the police officer’s duty belt. Back then, most cars had a shotgun racked up on the dash but now we see officers walking with a rifle on a tactical sling.
One retired friend summed it up well by saying, “When I started we discussed which load you carried in your .357 and how many cubic inches you had under the hood. Now these kids discuss which brand of running shoes they wear and how much RAM they have in their computer.”
Perhaps the most dramatic change is in the way we respond to life-threatening incidents. Back in the day, an officer-down call or active “shots fired” call was a “y’all come” situation. All the cops within radio range went screaming to the call, milled around the scene with little organization or direct leadership, and still managed to get the job done. Now, we use Rapid Deployment tactics to form the arriving officers into closely directed teams to enter the kill zone and hunt down the killer(s). I’m proud to have been in on these positive changes over the last 30+ years.
We are much better prepared to meet the increased threats of this generation, but sometimes we forget that the proper response to some events is NOT to go into harm’s way. Especially if you are supervising the fast moving response, saying NO will be the hardest decision you will ever make - but it just might save your entire team.
In our enhanced Rapid Deployment Version 2.0, we include the concept of SAFETY STOPS. When a team leader encounters one of several clearly defined situations, the proper course of action is to STOP the Rapid Deployment team and hold your position. The leader may choose to bypass the safety stop, but must be prepared to justify their actions in detail after the incident. The reason for a safety stop is to force the team leader to reassess the risks-to-rewards factor of their response.
The concept of safety stops applies equally to pre-planned raids. An example I use in training is the 1993 B.A.T.F. raid on the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas. As the B.A.T.F. developed the plan for their raid, two factors were considered crucial to success. First, they had to have the element of surprise. If David Koresh was tipped off, able to arm and ready the men of the compound, the raid would be aborted. Secondly, the men had to be in their normal morning pattern, working in the gardens outside of the buildings. The group’s guns were known to be kept in a second floor “armory,” so if the men were in the building where they could quickly access their weapons, the raid would be aborted. Using my terminology, these two factors were pre-planned safety stops.
As the convoy of black Suburbans headed en route to the compound on the day of the raid, a snitch called the team leader and told him their security had been compromised — David Koresh knew they were coming. The team leader ignored his own safety protocol and continued with the raid. Then, as the lead suburban came within sight of the compound, they radioed a crucial piece of intel: the men were NOT working in the gardens, everyone was inside the compound with access to the weapons. The team leader ignored his own second safety protocol and proceeded with the raid.
You know the rest of this story: the tragic ending on Day 51 included the death of four federal agents and 85 Branch Davidians, including 17 children. Two years later, on the anniversary of Day 51, Timothy McVeigh ended the lives of 168 interrelated victims when he detonated a truck bomb in front of Oklahoma City’s Murrah federal building. We can make a good argument for the use of safety stops. Obeying even one of their pre-planned stops the day of the B.A.T.F. raid might have saved 257 lives.
We recommend the following safety stops during a Rapid Deployment response to an active shooter:
• Hostages being held in a fixed location
• Gunman barricaded in a defensible location
• More than two active shooters
• Booby traps or ambush preparations
• Suspect is communicating demands
• Credible threat or use of a Hazardous Material or Weapon of Mass Destruction
Let’s analyze the “why” behind some of the recommended safety stops. If the suspect(s) are holding hostages, barricaded in a strong position and/or communicating demands, the situation has evolved into a classic barricaded gunman/hostage event that will require a full blown SWAT team, complete with crisis negotiators. I am not aware of any Rapid Deployment/Active Shooter Response training program that recommends for a team of patrol officers to assault such a barricaded location under these circumstances — they tell you to hold a tight perimeter and wait for SWAT.
If you are facing more than two active shooters, a team of four to five patrol officers is at a serious tactical disadvantage. Military guidelines for an assault recommend 5 to 1 odds in your favor, if possible. If the assaulting force falls below a 3 to 1 advantage, failure is likely. If your five officer team is facing three armed adversaries, your odds are now 1.66 to 1, far below the 3 to 1 minimum. A large disparity in personnel training, as we can assume when trained police officers are hunting down some punk high school kids, may allow you to carry the day, but we can’t always be sure they are punk kids.
If your team encounters booby traps or other ambush preparations, you are clearly not dealing with an amateur assailant. This safety stop points to a trained adversary who has had time to prepare the battlefield. In this case, the advantage goes to the enemy and you proceed only at extreme risk. The use or credible threat that your battleground could become a HAZMAT/WMD scene is, once again, an overwhelming threat. Few patrol officers are equipped to enter such a contaminated scene. Even when agencies issue effective gas masks and/or chemical suits, their personnel are not safe in Level A HAZMAT environment. The gear is only intended to protect you well enough to escape from the scene.
There may be circumstances when a team leader will choose to bypass a safety stop because developments demand such action. Let’s say your team is holding a perimeter, waiting for a SWAT team, when an active shooter has barricaded with a room full of hostages. If the shooter once again “goes active,” and begins killing all of the hostages, your team must make an emergency assault of the room to save as many hostages as possible. The risk is extreme, but you have no choice, duty demands action.
Several years ago, I stole a great catch-phrase from my friend Bob James. Bob retired as a Sergeant from the Illinois State Police, serving for many years as the lead trainer for their SWAT teams. My slow-talkin’, tobacco-spittin’ friend spoke with the wisdom that comes from many years as top police trainer and military SpecOps operator: “What we do is dangerous, but we must do it as safely as possible.”
