Editor’s Note: In PoliceOne “First Person” essays, our Members and Columnists candidly share their own unique view of the world. This is a platform from which individual officers can share their own personal insights on issues confronting cops today, as well as opinions, observations, and advice on living life behind the thin blue line. This week’s essay comes from PoliceOne Member Chris Leblanc, a use-of-force trainer and Corporal with the Vancouver, Washington Police Department. Do you want to share your own perspective with other P1 Members? Send us an e-mail with your story.
By Corporal Chris Leblanc
Vancouver (Wash.) Police Department
Law enforcement officers nationwide were profoundly impacted by the murders of four Lakewood, Washington officers in November 2009. We learned once again, the hard way, that officers can face encounters of extreme violence, often at very close quarters, and significantly behind the curve in terms of surprise and positional disadvantage.
As an officer and force tactics instructor in Washington State, I was continually distracted by thoughts of what happened at Lakewood. Were we preparing our officers for something like that? Would Lakewood be the 21st century “Newhall” with lessons learned reverberating throughout the profession? How could we draw from those lessons, and our training in police combat disciplines, to find ways of dealing with a situation like that?
Are We Preparing?
In discussions with other trainers, a question often posed was why one or both the officers that fought with the suspect at Lakewood did not simply engage the shooter from a distance with their firearms. Having been to that Forza coffee shop, the distance is not great, and it is a logical question. We now know that Officer Owens elected to go hands on with Clemmons as Officer Richards approached from his position at the counter.
In light of this, we have look at how we train. No agency would put an officer down range, standing next to a target, and allow another officer to fire at that target, even from a few yards. If a firearms cadre did do something like that, they would likely be met with a storm of protests from the students and soon find themselves out of their training units.
So, can we expect that officers will see another in direct physical contact with a suspect and fighting over a weapon - with all the chaotic, jerky movement that this would produce - and have the ability to engage with rounds from any distance?
Partner-Assisted Weapon Retention
We came up with one alternative response in some weapon retention training shortly after the details of Lakewood were known. One drill that we performed was met enthusiastically by numerous officers, and I offer it here for interested trainers to try, and to improve upon.
The genesis of this drill came from training on our regional SWAT team. Like most, our team trained in hostage rescue, which included contact shooting and a drill known as “covered pile.” Both of these involve getting in close with a suspect in physical contact with a hostage and engaging with contact shots in order to stop the threat. Due to the fact that these are hostage situations, the hostage had to be kept out of the line of fire and the “backstop” on the other side of the suspect. Partner Assisted Weapon Retention draws from these principles, seeing the Officer as the “hostage.”
The drill is presented this way:
1.) Officer A is retaining his weapon — either in the holster or in hand — against a suspect that is attempting to disarm.
2.) Officer A calls “he’s got my gun” or otherwise communicates the situation.
3.) Officer B moves in and engages by getting hold of and manipulating the suspect’s head or body, or by moving/manipulating their fellow officer’s head or body out of the line of fire, and fires contact shots.
For example, Officer B moves in behind the suspect, taking the suspect’s hair or grabbing the head (by the forehead, or by driving the fingers into the eye sockets to gain purchase), and pulling the suspect’s head backward while placing the muzzle of the firearm below the base of the skull. This will present a near-contact shot to the base of the brain or top of the spinal cord.
Alternatively, Officer B can push Officer A’s head down, or lean over Officer A’s head and back so that the head could not rise, and fires into the suspect’s head/face at near contact range.
4.) Officer B may have to intersperse his body between the suspect and Officer A, even assisting in controlling the suspect’s arms on A’s weapon, and fire multiple low line shots into the suspect’s abdomen and pelvis until the threat ceases.
After initial familiarity training, the suspect role player can and should move and react to disrupt Officer B’s movement and field of fire, and even attempt to use Officer A as a shield. This creates a challenging and dynamic situation for Officer B to respond to, and is realistic.
Some General Notes
In presenting this training, some general rules and observations were noted and shared within our groups.
Officer A’s weapon retention efforts must be effective. If Officer A loses his weapon it will be used against him and against fellow officers.
Officer A must participate in his own rescue, helping to move or control the suspect’s body, and/or getting his own head or body out of the line of fire.
Officer A must communicate to Officer B. Rescue Officers could fail to recognize that a weapon retention situation is occurring, or have some hesitation as to whether Officer A’s efforts are effective and whether they should engage. If Officer A communicates “he’s got my gun” the response should assume that the officer is in danger of losing control of the firearm.
Similarly, Officer A can communicate “I’ve got him, he won’t get my gun” if the weapon is under control, and alternative force options should be used to control the suspect.
Officer B should avoid projecting his weapon toward or “stabbing” the suspect with his weapon. While this is commonly seen as soon as the contact and speed picks up, it is less than optimal. Projecting a weapon at the suspect may see the weapon’s muzzle averted, thus limiting the ability of Officer B to engage, or perhaps create a malfunction after one round if the weapon is fired while the suspect is holding onto it. As well, under extreme stress and chaotic movement, a weapon could be forced out of battery through stabbing into the suspect, or could be cycled/partially cycled if a suspect twists or moves while the slide is in contact, also inducing a malfunction. Having to rescue a fellow officer in such a situation is the very definition of a “bad day,” attempting to do so with a weapons malfunction takes that even further, and loses critical time.
For added realism, cycling/firing training weapons can be used. It should be noted that Airsoft weapons tend not to be robust enough for realistic weapon retention training actually wrestling over guns, and firing training projectiles at these distances is not recommend by manufacturers such as Simmunition.
Conclusion
There will always be times when officers will be killed regardless of their training and experience. No training covers every conceivable situation, and the nebulous factor Luck presents is always a reality in dynamic lethal force encounters.
But Luck favors the prepared, and by training more realistically, we may improve our chances and allow officers to decisively take advantage of a lucky break when it presents itself.
