Key takeaways
The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2025 decision in Ames v. Ohio changes how Title VII sex discrimination claims must be handled — and clarifies that the law protects all employees equally, regardless of their demographic group. Here’s what agency leaders and HR teams need to know:
- Same rules for everyone: Employers can’t require more proof from “majority-group” employees (like heterosexual women) than from minority-group employees (like LGBTQ+ workers) when claiming discrimination.
- Court rejected unfair legal standard: The Court struck down the “background circumstances” rule, which had forced some employees to show extra evidence just to get their day in court.
- Ruling reverses precedent in five circuits: Agencies in several states, including those under the Sixth Circuit (Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, Tennessee), must now apply a uniform evidentiary standard to all discrimination cases.
- Title VII applies across the board: Whether hiring, promoting or disciplining, law enforcement employers must make decisions free of bias — and document those decisions consistently.
- Training and policy impact: Agencies should review their employment practices to ensure all employees — regardless of race, sex, sexual orientation or other status — are treated fairly and protected under federal law.
On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court decided a case entitled Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS). [1] In this case, Marlean Ames was employed by ODYS, which operates Ohio’s juvenile corrections system. Ames, a heterosexual female, was initially hired as an executive secretary in 2004. She was later promoted to the position of program administrator and in 2019 applied for a higher management position in OYDS in the Office of Quality and Improvement.
She was interviewed for the position, but the ODYS hired a lesbian female to fill the role. A few days later, ODYS removed her from her current position as program administrator and demoted her to her original position as executive secretary, with a corresponding significant pay cut. ODYS next hired a gay man to take over her program administrator position. Ames subsequently filed a lawsuit against ODYS, alleging that she was discriminated against by ODYS on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of Title VII, of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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The Ames lawsuit
The District Court granted summary judgement to ODYS and dismissed the suit. The court ruled that Ames, a member of a “majority group” (heterosexual female), did not produce any evidence of so-called “background circumstances” that showed that: (1) A member of a minority group (e.g., a gay person) was involved in denying her promotion or denied her promotion or (2) statistical data showing that ODYS had engaged in a similar pattern of past decisions denying promotions to heterosexual females and promoting persons of a minority group (i.e. homosexuals) instead.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling and likewise ruled that Ames failed to provide evidence of “background circumstances” to show that a member of a “relevant minority group,” (i.e., gay people) “made the employment decision” or “statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination … against members of the ‘majority group’” (heterosexual females). Ames filed a petition for a grant of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Court accepted the case for review and reversed.
The Supreme Court decision
The Court began its opinion by pointing out that there was a significant split between the federal circuit courts regarding evidentiary burden of proof that must be met by plaintiffs from “majority- groups” like that which included Ames. The Court observed that the Sixth Circuit and four other circuits, [2] “have held or suggested that “majority-group” plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened burden to make out a prima facie case of disparate (discriminatory) treatment under Title VII.” The Court noted that this heightened burden of proof, characterized among the five circuits as the “background circumstances” requirement, was not imposed upon plaintiffs from “minority groups.”
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and rejected its application of the heightened burden of proof, i.e. “background circumstances” requirement, that it imposed upon Ames, as a member of a “majority-group.” The Court first examined its prior decisions to provide the foundation for Title VII, intentional discrimination cases.
The Court stated:
“Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In McDonnell Douglas,[3] this Court laid out a three-step burden-shifting framework for evaluating claims arising under that provision. The McDonnell Douglas framework aims to ‘bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question’ in a disparate-treatment case — namely, whether ‘the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’ [4]
“At the first step of the familiar three-step inquiry, the plaintiff bears the ‘initial burden’ of ‘establishing a prima facie case’ by producing enough evidence to support an inference of discriminatory motive. [5] If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden then ‘shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’ Finally, if the employer articulates such a justification, the plaintiff must then have a ‘fair opportunity’ to show that the stated justification ‘was in fact pretext’ for discrimination.”
The rejection of the heightened burden of proof requirement imposed on “majority group” plaintiffs
The Court examined the plain language of Title VII and observed that the statutory language, “draws no distinction between majority-group plaintiffs (like Ames) and minority-group plaintiffs.” The Court explained, Title VII, “makes it unlawful ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The Court explained further, “By establishing the same protections for every ‘individual’ — without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group — Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.”
The Court concluded by stating, “The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs — those who are members of majority groups — to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in order to carry their burden under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for application of the proper prima facie standard.”
Lessons learned
- Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from being intentionally discriminated against by their employers, Including police departments, and law enforcement agencies, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
- Title VII protects all individuals from intentional discrimination in employment regardless of whether they are members of a majority-group ( i.e., heterosexual females) or a minority- group (e.g., homosexual females.
- Placing additional burdens of proof upon plaintiffs from majority-groups and thus treating them differently than plaintiffs from minority groups is a direct violation of Title VII and will no longer be tolerated.
- Police leadership must be very careful to avoid intentional discrimination in employment hiring and promotion decision making.
- Police leadership must reject any decision that would intentionally discriminate against any individual based upon race, color, religion, sex. or national origin.
References
1. No. 23-1039.
2. The other four circuits are the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and the DC Circuit.
3. McDonnell Douglas Vv. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
5. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802.
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