On January 8, 2015, Shela Linton was among a group of approximately 200 demonstrators at the Vermont Statehouse protesting the alleged failure of the Vermont Governor to support universal healthcare. At 8 p.m. that evening, when the Statehouse was scheduled for normal closure, law enforcement officers informed the group that they must leave or face arrest. Linton and 28 other people decided not to leave the legislative chamber inside the Statehouse. Instead, they formed a circle on the floor, linking their arms and singing social justice songs.
After the remaining protesters ignored the arrest warning, officers began to arrest them. Vermont State Police Sergeant Jacob Zorn and Trooper Seth Richardson approached Linton, who was sitting on the floor. She was asked to stand. When she failed to stand, Trooper Richardson grabbed her right arm, and Sgt. Zorn took hold of her left arm. Richardson had to tug at her arm three times before he could unlink it from a fellow protester. Zorn applied pressure to her left arm to unlink it from another demonstrator.
Linton refused Zorn’s repeated requests to stand, saying, “I will not stand up.” Zorn asked her again to please stand, and she shook her head in the negative. Zorn warned her that he would apply more pressure if she failed to stand, but to no avail. Zorn applied a “rear wristlock” — a “pain compliance technique” in an attempt to gain Linton’s compliance. This effort was not successful, and Linton cried out in pain.
According to the court, “Sergeant Zorn then allegedly twisted Ms. Linton’s arm behind her back; Ms. Linton shouted, “Don’t twist my arm!” Other demonstrators still present in the chamber shouted, “Don’t hurt her.” The officers were finally able to lift her to her feet, but she claims she yelled out in extreme pain and fell back on the floor. Sgt. Zorn allegedly told her that she should have called her legislator. Eventually, three officers had to carry her outside the Statehouse. The court indicated, “As a result of the events of the day, she suffered permanent damage to her left wrist and shoulder and alleges that she has consequently been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety, apparently resulting from these events.”
The Linton lawsuit
Linton sued Sgt. Zorn in the federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he used unreasonable excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Zorn responded by moving for dismissal by summary judgment, claiming that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed, holding that “there was no clearly established law that put Sergeant Zorn on notice that his conduct was unlawful, therefore rendering his actions as to Ms. Linton legally immune.” Linton filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The decision of the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit reversed the decision, ruling that the law was clearly established at the time of the Linton incident that tactics like those allegedly used by Sgt. Zorn were excessive when applied to passive resistors. [1] The court observed that the question of whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity has two prongs: (1) An officer has qualified immunity if the facts that the plaintiff has alleged or shown fail to establish a violation of a constitutional right or (2) the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. The presiding judge has discretion to decide which prong to examine first. [2] In this case, the district court judge decided to examine the “clearly established law “prong first.
The Second Circuit also observed that in conducting the qualified immunity analysis, disputed material facts must be construed by the court in favor of the non-moving party (i.e. the Plaintiff). The court decided to examine the “clearly established law” prong of the qualified immunity analysis first because the district court reached its decision in favor of Sgt. Zorn by concluding that he did not violate clearly established law.
The court next examined past legal precedent to determine whether previously decided case law placed Sgt. Zorn on clear notice that his alleged application of force was unreasonable and excessive. The court found its prior decision in Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford to be highly relevant and instructive. [3] In Amnesty America, protesters at a West Hartford, Connecticut abortion clinic chained themselves together and blocked entry to an area in the clinic. During police efforts to remove them, tactics employed included “throwing [one plaintiff] face-down to the ground, dragging [another plaintiff] face-down by his legs, causing a second-degree burn on his chest; placing a knee on [a third plaintiff]’s neck in order to tighten his handcuffs while he was lying face-down, ramming [that third plaintiff’s] head into a wall at a high speed,’ and so-called “pain compliance techniques,” including ‘pressing [the protesters’] wrists back against their forearms in a way that caused lasting damage.’” [4]
The court in Linton observed that in Amnesty America it “warned officers against gratuitously employing “pain compliance techniques,” such as bending protesters’ wrists, thumbs, and fingers backwards.’” [5] The court concluded, “that Amnesty America did clearly establish that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques—such as a rear-wristlock—on a protester who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force and is therefore violative of that arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Police officers, including Sergeant Zorn, were or should have been on notice on January 8, 2015, that they could be held personally liable for such conduct.”
The court next examined the first prong of the qualified immunity defense (i.e., did the facts as alleged by Linton, if true, establish an excessive force violation by Sgt. Zorn?). The court concluded that there are disputed material facts (i.e., different versions of what happened) between the parties that must be resolved by a trial jury before a determination on excessive force can be made.[6] The court remanded the case to the district court for trial.
Lessons learned
- Recurrent in-service legal training for law enforcement officers is essential for line officers and their supervising officials to become cognizant of court decisions that clearly establish new constitutional principles.
- Failure to adhere to clearly established constitutional law principles will lead to a denial of qualified immunity in civil actions and the potential for criminal charges.
- Failure to provide in-service legal updates may result in successful failure to train lawsuits against police supervisors and their municipalities. [7]
- Police supervisors who participate in excessive force situations; order that it be employed by subordinate officers; or stand-by (i.e., fail to intervene) while it is being administered will be subject to personal liability; potential criminal charges and cause municipal liability for their cities and towns. [8]
- According to the Second Circuit, the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques — such as a rear-wristlock — on a protester who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force and is therefore violative of that arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights.
- The Second Circuit declared in its Amnesty America ruling that police tactics allegedly used against passive resisting demonstrators, if true, reached the excessive force level. These include: “throwing [one plaintiff] face-down to the ground, dragging [another plaintiff] face-down by his legs, causing a second-degree burn on his chest; placing a knee on [a third plaintiff]’s neck in order to tighten his handcuffs while he was lying face-down, ramming [that third plaintiff’s] head into a wall at a high speed,” and so-called “pain compliance techniques,” including “pressing [the protesters’] wrists back against their forearms in a way that caused lasting damage. [9]
- During Linton’s arrest, Sgt. Zorn allegedly told her that she should have called her legislator. This gratuitous comment, if true, was unprofessional. Commentary like this should be avoided because it can be used against the speaker in later litigation to show evidence of a purpose to harm subjective intent.
References
1. Linton v. Zorn, (No. 22-2954) (2d Cir. 2025).
2. Ashcroft v. Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,735 (2011) and Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014).
3. 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
4. Id. at 119, 123.
5. Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 119.
6. The court explained, “If a jury were to adopt Ms. Linton’s version as to those facts genuinely in dispute in toto, we conclude, as we did in Amnesty America, that it could determine that the defendant’s use of force was objectively unreasonable. If, however, a jury resolves these facts in accordance with Sergeant Zorn’s version of the events, it may determine that he did not violate Ms. Linton’s Fourth Amendment rights, or that his conduct was not clearly unreasonable in light of the teaching of Amnesty America.”
7. See, City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) and John M. Callahan Jr., ”Supervisory and Municipal Liability in Law Enforcement,” Looseleaf Law Publications, pgs. 18-20 (2018).
8. See Callahan, “Supervisory and Municipal Liability in Law Enforcement,” Looseleaf Law Publications, pgs. 28-31 (2018).
9. Supra, note 4.
