For advice on how to better handle barricaded-subject standoffs, LAPD cops are going literally to the “insiders” — the barricaded and often suicidal subjects themselves. Through extensive post-incident interviews in prisons, mental health facilities, and private homes, investigators are amassing a rich trove of information on what works and what doesn’t in these high-profile SWAT callouts, from the unique perspective of the individuals at the center of the action.
The lessons learned through these debriefings are sharpening the performances of first responders, tactical operators, and crisis negotiators. In the long run, the information is expected to encourage tactics that can more quickly resolve unpredictable, high-risk confrontations and save lives among officers and offenders alike.
Some findings from this experimental approach were presented at the most recent IACP annual conference by Det. II Teresa Irvin, field supervisor for the Mental Evaluation Unit of LAPD’s Crisis Response Support Section, and Lt. Ruben Lopez, officer in charge of the department’s SWAT operations. Both elaborated on the program in recent conversations with Police1.
Dealing with Suicidal Subjects
By department mandate, Irvin’s 42-member unit is notified whenever officers are dealing with suicidal subjects or with barricades involving potentially violent, mentally ill individuals. About four years ago when she was assigned to the MEU’s investigative section, she began looking closely at critical incidents that involved a SWAT response or that seemed likely to produce a repeat callout.
She visited subjects after they’d had weeks or months to calm down and reflect on their experience, and in informal interviews she spent “a lot of time” reviewing details of their incidents with them, particularly seeking their opinions on the pros and cons of the police response. “No one ever went back and asked the suspect or subject for any feedback,” she says. “That became a motivator for me because I felt critical information was being missed in traditional after-action debriefings.”
Initially, most of her fellow officers “didn’t think I would garner much useful information,” she recalls. But as her “missing link” effort expanded, “the amount I gained that would be helpful to patrol first responders, SWAT team members, and negotiators was tremendous. These incidents tend to be major moments in the subjects’ lives, and they generally remember each and every detail.”
In time, Irvin was joined in making the contacts by SWAT team leader Mike Baker, who showed a “passionate interest” in what she was doing, and the debriefings became a collaborative project between the MEU and LAPD SWAT. Often Irvin and Baker are now accompanied by a negotiator who was involved in the incident at hand. As a group or singly, she estimates they have debriefed nearly 50 subjects.
Candid Q&As Caught on Tape
They show up in plainclothes unannounced after any criminal prosecution is concluded and obtain the subject’s voluntary consent to talk, with the assurance the information will be used only for training purposes. “No promises are ever made regarding appeals, re-opening cases, or other favors,” Lopez says. The candid Q&A that follows is videotaped with a hand-held camcorder, and the tapes are shared in training sessions with SWAT operators, negotiators, and patrol officers.
“The debriefing allows the subject to tell his or her side of the story about what occurred, including what was in their mind and why they behaved as they did,” Irvin says. Also the subject is provided explanation for questions he may have, offering a positive closure on both sides.”
In addition, the interviews on occasion provide reconnaissance opportunities inside locations that police may need to deal with again on future calls.
“For instance,” Irvin explains, “I had a mentally ill subject who was the focus of repeat radio calls and a barricade. On a debrief at his home, we discovered that his mother had installed heavy security screens on each door inside the house to “cage” him and protect herself. That information was crucial to pass on to SWAT and patrol because response teams deploying to that location would not expect those barriers after breeching the front or rear door.”
Although most of the interviewees have mental problems but are not criminals per se, a minority have been hard-core lawbreakers who simply did not want to surrender without a standoff. Both types have been willing — and lucidly able — to cooperate with debriefings. “We have been able to gain something useful from each interview we have conducted,” Irvin says. “Most of the subjects are appreciative of being asked.”
Common Threads
Each crisis call is different, Irvin and Lopez point out, but some common threads have emerged from the debriefings that lend themselves to important lessons learned. Here’s a sampling:
• Inside a barricade, “subjects can hear more than we think,” says Lopez. Some interviewees have reported hearing SWAT operators bump up against houses during deployment, giving away their position. Others have picked up conversation between officers outside.
During one holiday callout, a subject who was holding his wife and child hostage overheard disgruntled officers referring to him disparagingly and muttering that he should “come out so we can all get home for Christmas.” “That pissed me off,” he reported. “I decided I was going to stay in there all day.” He actually held out for a day and a half. “A lack of noise discipline can endanger responders and hinder the effectiveness of negotiators,” Lopez notes.
Irvin adds: “If a negotiator is trying to communicate a message of trust and concern, it will be discounted” if the suspect heard remarks that “don’t communicate the same message.”
• Once containment is established, continuing the screaming sirens of Code 3 responses and the deafening roar of hovering airships may no longer be desirable, Lopez and Irvin have come to believe. Mental patients, especially, report that the intense racket and excitement “increase feelings of paranoia and reinforce the impression that the situation is hopeless, there’s no way out, they’ve lost everything,” Irvin explains. “The next step may be escalation to suicide or to attempt a suicide by cop.”
• Word choice and delivery matter. A distraught, armed female who barricaded herself during a lovers’ quarrel with her girlfriend said she resisted cooperating with a negotiator because he “elevated her emotions” by repeatedly referring to the girlfriend as a “hostage,” when in fact she was free to walk out whenever she chose to. Other subjects have reported initial verbal parries by “ramped up” officers as being “too rapid-fire to understand.” Some complained that first responders made no attempt whatever to establish contact, keeping silent until designated crisis negotiators arrived.
“That may take 90 minutes in some cases,” Irvin says. “Meanwhile, the subject’s mind is stirring, not knowing what to expect, deepening the anxiety. It’s better to occupy these people with talk sooner than later.”
• Lopez says, “Cops could lose credibility when they try to downplay an incident,” thinking that minimizing the situation will make an offender more likely to give up. He recalls a negotiator telling a barricaded suspect who’d been involved in a significant use of force with first responders that the offense was “not that big a deal.” The suspect, interviewed in prison, told the debriefing team, “I’m a career criminal. I know what’s up. I thought you guys were trying to play me,” raising his skepticism while extending his resistance.
Others, who were in “the crisis of their lives,” reported feeling disrespected by attempts to minimize their situation. “I felt the negotiator wasn’t listening to me,” one subject said.
• Threats aren’t likely to work. “Some subjects have been told by first responders, ‘If you don’t give up, we’ll have to call SWAT and they’ll gas your house,’ ” Irvin recounts. “But in most cases, the person’s crisis is so big they simply don’t care. We have not ever received feedback that a warning or K-9 or SWAT has even convinced a barricaded subject to come out. ”
• A number of subjects have talked about the impact of chemical agents and how their effects can be negated. “One told us he lay under his bed with a wet towel over his head,” Irvin says. “Another vented his roof from the attic with a hose. Chemical intervention is often not effective with mentally ill people. They’re so over-stimulated they don’t seem to feel it.” Lopez adds, “If gas isn’t working, you need to consider whether it’s desirable or will be ineffective to put more in to the point of saturation.”
• Subjects often report that they delayed surrendering because they feared they would be hurt. “Keep reassuring them that even though SWAT is outside, you’re not there to hurt them,” Lopez advises. “Reinforce with family members that you’re working toward a peaceful resolution, in case they do have contact with the subject. It may help to promise the family that if the suspect comes out calmly they can see him before you haul him off to jail to be assured that he’s ok.”
• Small kindnesses — and slights — are remembered. Lopez recalls a barricaded female who surrendered peacefully and “just wanted to touch her dad’s hand before she went to jail.” Police at the scene wouldn’t permit it, angering her. “Some of these people are going to be repeat customers, and they do tend to remember every detail,” Lopez says. “We want to exploit little gestures when we can.”
Irvin agrees. “If subjects perceive that they were treated badly, they will be more challenging to deal with on the next call,” she says. An example of behavior she deplores concerns a hostage-taker currently in prison. An officer who’d been at his scene boasts of sending him a Christmas card every year, mocking the fact that he’s serving time.
“That offender will be out one day, maybe not in the lifetime of that officer but in the lifetime of another, and he will have great potential to repeat his behavior,” Irvin says. “Unfortunately, the next officer responding to his location will be a reminder of that Christmas card without ever knowing it.”
• Slowing things down and buying time is a response approach that seems to be almost universally endorsed by interviewees. “Time usually leads to the de-escalation of emotions and the increase in rational thinking,” Lopez says. “And that’s true of responding officers as well as suspects.”
Since the interviewing began, “our crisis responses have gotten better,” Irvin believes. When officers are shown the tapes for training purposes, “they’re captivated,” she says. To hear subjects articulating why they acted, what they were thinking, what they saw, what they feared, what they’d like to see different underscores that “there’s a real person behind every incident,” Lopez says. “It benefits officers to know this.”
In Lopez’s opinion, subject debriefing should be considered a “best practice” for SWAT operations everywhere. Irvin is hopeful that their IACP presentation will “send the message to the command staff at other departments to get this going.” She and Mike Baker have provided training on how to conduct fruitful subject debriefings to outside agencies interested in launching such a program.
Contact Irvin at teresalynn.irvin@yahoo.com, Baker at ndirish1@ix.netcom.com, and Lopez at 25900@ LAPD.LACITY.org.
