Editor’s note: Two weeks after the attacks in Mumbai, India—in which fewer than a dozen militants held at bay some 800 police for 60 hours—PoliceOne presented a special report including articles from Police1 Columnists Lt. Dan Marcou and Sgt. Glenn French, as well as analysis from Stratfor and opinion from P1 members. Today we present the final installment in this three-part series from Police1 Columnist Dick Fairburn on the important subject of police readiness and training for a Mumbai-style attack. Be sure to check out part one here, and part two here.
In the first two parts of this series, we discussed the new type of threat posed by multiple teams of terrorists attacking a city with small arms (automatic rifles and grenades). A response tactic was also proposed, that being an infantry-style variation of a Rapid Deployment team, already familiar to us from previous training for Active Shooter response. No doubt, some of you strongly disagree that we should ever consider sending teams of patrol officers to counterattack terrorist teams.
The reality is, teams of patrol officers are the only resource we will have to counter such a threat in the first few, precious minutes. Even full-time SWAT teams will require 30+ minutes to assemble, and even the SWAT assets of a large city would be unable to engage 10 separate attack sites, like those we saw in Mumbai. So, beyond the team tactics outlined in part two, what can we do to help our Rapid Deployment teams be more successful?
Leadership
I covered this subject in a couple of weeks ago in part two—outlining the role of a team leader in assembling their officers—but leadership is so important, it’s worth another consideration here. Since a single city’s SWAT assets are probably too small to address multiple teams of terrorists, I suggest they be used in another way.
John Giduck, author of the book “Terror at Beslan,” correctly calls police SWAT officers the “Special Forces of homeland security,” equating them to the Army’s Green Berets and Delta operators. By sending one or two on-duty SWAT operators to the rally point of every Rapid Deployment team forming to counterattack the terrorists, those SWAT officers could assume command of the teams and greatly enhance their effectiveness. The highly-trained and experienced SWAT officers can provide the dynamic leadership necessary to keep the team moving forward in the face of stiff resistance.
This ancient quote has been attributed to many authors, but is appropriate here and goes something like this: “It is better to have an army of lambs led by a lion, than an army of lions led by a lamb.”
The command element of the jurisdiction’s SWAT team should locate at a centralized Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to coordinate the influx of SWAT teams inbound to the request for mutual-aid. The attacking terrorist teams will likely go to ground, probably gathering all available hostages as they do so. An intelligence link must be established with the 911 center to forward the data gleaned from incoming citizen calls - they will automatically be tracking the terrorists’ movements. The hosting SWAT command element can then work with arriving SWAT assets to develop hasty plans and deploy those SWAT teams to replace each Rapid Deployment team, bringing more expertise and hardware to bear on the likely hostage/barricade situations.
Weaponry
Lt. Col. Dave Grossman said it best, “taking a rifle to a gunfight is like taking a chainsaw to a knife fight.” The terrorists will be armed with the best assault-style rifles they can obtain, so we must match them. Nothing less will do the job. A Sidearm is for when all else has failed. Sub-machineguns will lack the penetrating power and range necessary for such a fight. A shotgun on each team might be an advantage for close-in work and busting locks and hinges with specialized loads. So we’re basically looking at variations of the M16/AR15 family of weapons—which are already in widespread use by patrol officers and they’ll do just fine.
Both Army and Marine units in the war on terror are now fielding .308/7.62mm caliber rifles, generally one per fire team, for use by a “Designated Marksman.” These rifles, commonly M14s pulled from mothballs, or new Knight SR25 variations of the original AR10 design, mount medium powered optics to give the team increased accuracy and punch over their M16s. These are not sniper rifles, nor are the shooters trained up to the sniper level. But their effectiveness in combat has been so valuable, the program is expanding rapidly. One Designated Marksman per Rapid Deployment team would allow hits beyond iron-sighted range and the ability to better penetrate light cover and body armor.
In terms of ammunition, use what you normally use, and bring a lot of it. Each officer should have a “grab and go” battle bag or vest with at least 200 rounds of rifle ammunition (perhaps less for the Designated Marksman if the weight is too great). All rifles should be fired on SEMI-AUTOMATIC.
Those among you who might argue for full-auto fire need only analyze the effectiveness of the bad guys at the North Hollywood bank robbery. Those two felons sprayed more than 1,100 rounds of hand-held automatic rifle fire, wounding 17 officers and citizens, but killing no one. I am not discounting the terrible toll at that robbery scene, merely pointing out that hand-held automatic fire is extremely impressive, and frightening, but not really very effective.
Your Rapid Deployment teams must train with the discipline to fire single, aimed shots or risk burning through their ammunition supply in very short order. Unless you have access to light, belt-fed weapons like a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), and you have the time and money to train with them extensively, stick to your rifles set on semi-automatic.
During your train-up for this response, have all officers become familiar with the weapons terrorists are likely to bring to the fight. If they have a choice, you can expect to face a variant of the Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK47, AKM, AK74), since this is their most familiar weapon and the one they will smuggle in, or obtain here, if they can. Make sure each officer has at least basic familiarization on how to load, clear and fire an AK. They may need to make use of a battlefield pick-up weapon to stay in the fight.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
At the very least, each officer on the Rapid Deployment teams must be wearing their normal, soft body armor. Since their issue body armor WILL NOT protect them from the weaponry we can expect from the terrorists, Level III or IV (hard) armor is preferred, but unlikely to be available to all street officers. Similarly, ballistic helmets would be a great protection advantage. If all you have available are riot-type helmets, I suggest you leave them in the trunk. Riot helmets offer no ballistic protection and would degrade an officer’s movement and hearing during the headlong “rush” phase of Fire and Maneuver tactics.
Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS)
Each officer should carry a basic life-support kit for themselves, which must include at least one large battle dressing they can apply one-handed and cinch down for heavy direct pressure. A package of clotting agent and/or battle dressings impregnated with clotting agent should be included. In case any arterial bleeding is not being controlled by the battle dressing and clotting agent, their kit must contain a tourniquet that can also be applied with one-hand. If an officer goes down, an assisting officer must use the downed officer’s own medical gear, saving his own for himself.
Tough decisions will be needed. We may be forced to leave wounded officers behind to maintain pressure on the terrorists and keep them from killing as freely as they had planned. In a worst-case scenario, we may have to leave a wounded officer to treat themselves, if another officer could be lost attempting to reach them. Our teams are already too small and too lightly armed for the mission they face. All unnecessary risks must be carefully weighed by the team leader.
If your SWAT team has a TEMS program, have those medics available to respond with Rapid Deployment teams. Some TEMS medics are police officers trained up as Paramedics, while other jurisdictions cross-train Firefighter/Paramedics to accompany the teams. Having a medic within earshot can save many lives during this fight. Some lucky teams have Medical Doctors and Registered Nurses who train-up to accompany the SWAT element into battle. Since we can expect MANY casualties—both police and civilian—these invaluable assets may be best utilized at triage sites near the action.
By now, the naysayers reading this should be about ready to explode. You’re convinced I’m advocating wholesale police suicide by suggesting we train and prepare patrol officers to respond to a Mumbai-style attack. You are entitled to your opinion—fire away with your email responses! Please, just keep the comments semi-civil.
I spent a good deal of time thinking this subject through and sent it out for peer review by some of the finest police and military thinkers I know. They made worthwhile comments and suggestions, all of which were included in the final product
If even one of those experts had said, “Dick, you’re totally, bleeping crazy,” you would not be reading this now.
I know this: If an attack like the one at Mumbai strikes a U.S. community, ordinary police officers will run to the sound of the gunfire. Those officers will use whatever they are issued—or can scrounge—and will fight to the best of their ability. And, in so responding, many of those officers will die. We owe those officers as much practical training and equipment as we can muster, to enhance their effectiveness ... and survival. They will go, with or without preparation.
I am getting old, hampered by aliments and more than a decade removed from the street, but I will still pick up a weapon and run with those brave officers to the sound of the guns, so far as I am able. If you’re one who is not willing to go, then step aside.
“Lead me, follow me, or get out of my way!”
General George S. Patton, Jr.
