Key takeaways
- Scenario-based police training exposed gaps in weapon retention skills — Officers often struggled to holster or retain control of their firearm when confronted by a rapidly advancing, unarmed subject.
- Unholstering a firearm too early can limit use-of-force options — In the training exercise, officers who drew their weapons before confirming the threat were unable to safely transition to less-lethal tools during a physical confrontation.
- High-stress law enforcement training revealed memory and perception distortions — Officers frequently misjudged when they fired their weapon, highlighting how stress can affect situational awareness and after-action reporting.
- Realistic police training emphasized the risks of relying solely on a firearm — A drawn weapon did not stop the threat and often put officers at greater risk during close-quarters engagements with unarmed attackers.
A law enforcement training session I conducted illustrates how an officer’s decision to display a firearm when responding to a call can shape subsequent decisions and response options — particularly when a visibly unarmed, advancing threat ignores both the officer’s commands and the presence of the weapon.
These findings also have implications for citizens who carry a firearm and use it as a deterrent against unarmed threats. As always, context matters. The officers’ performance and decisions during the training were influenced by individual characteristics, beliefs and experience, which led to a range of responses — from intentionally grounding the firearm once a physical struggle began to shooting the attacker before the fight started.
Scenario overview
During a scripted scenario, officers were provided firearms loaded with marking cartridges and were wearing protective gear. A suspect was outfitted in protective gear allowing for impact strikes and “firearm” use against him. For this scenario, an officer was dispatched to a domestic violence event, as reported by a neighbor. Additional information included that there was a history of domestic violence between the couple at the residence and the male was more violent when using methamphetamine. During the response, as the officer approached a small building that represented the home, screaming could be heard from inside. The male was threatening to kill his wife while she yelled that she could not breathe, indicative of an ongoing violent and potentially life-threatening struggle.
When the officer entered the home from outside a closed door, the officer would see the suspect choking/grabbing the victim, who was being held/choked against a wall approximately 15 feet across the room from the front door. Upon the officer opening the door and/or entry into the home, the male would release the female and rapidly and aggressively (but not running) approach the officer, empty-handed, yelling at the officer to get out of the house. The role-player was told to ignore any commands given by the officers and close the distance to initiate an attack.
The training was done at full speed, and there was significant physical contact between the role-player and officers to best produce officer behaviors that might emerge in a real-world scenario. Further, the attacker did not stop even after being struck by marking cartridges, a real possibility absent shots to the central nervous system, especially with possible methamphetamine use involved.
Twenty-four (24) officers participated in this scenario, with experience ranging from a single year to over 20 years in law enforcement. The scenario was videotaped to capture the actions of the officers: when and if they drew the firearm, ability to holster the firearm under threat or active attack, when they fired, the strategies used to defend their firearm when holstered and unholstered, and the effectiveness of those strategies in resolving the threat.
Immediately after the scenario ended for an officer, they were asked about what drove their decisions/action choices.
- Nine (9) officers drew firearms prior to opening the door of the home based on dispatched information and hearing a violent struggle; ten (10) officers immediately drew after opening the door and observing the nature of the attack.
- None of the nineteen (19) officers who drew their weapon were able to securely holster it before the unarmed subject began physically attacking them. It took the attacker between 1.5–2.5 seconds to close the distance to the officer. Roughly a third of participants were unsure if the attacker was holding a weapon or not.
- There was a noticeable deficit in the skilled protection of a drawn weapon:
- Most officers did not demonstrate technical or conceptual fighting skills/strategies when engaging with the attacking role-player, such as effectively managing distance, limiting or controlling the movements of the attacker while denying access to the firearm, creating angles, or controlling the subject on the ground. This was true of officers who had not drawn their weapons and those who did. Individuals largely displayed what can most accurately be described as schoolyard brawling, which did produce some acceptable outcomes.
- There were three exceptions to displaying skilled fighting: one female officer with MMA experience clinched and then performed a hip throw of the larger attacker and immediately obtained cross-body head and arm control, using her pistol to complete the connection of her arms after her weapon failed to fire; a former wrestler executed a double-leg takedown, albeit after intentionally placing his firearm on the ground (see below). Only one officer did an unbalancing technique and takedown that was recognizable as having been taught for LE purposes.
How officers responded to the advancing threat
Half (12) of the officers shot, or tried to shoot, the unarmed threat:
- Nine (9) officers shot the attacker before physical contact was made. Two (2) additional officers shot after contact was made. Physical contact with the attacker prevented both weapons from cycling after the chambered round was fired. The final (1) officer tried to fire as contact was made but did not have a round in the chamber.
- Half (12) of the officers did not shoot or attempt to shoot the unarmed threat.
- Seven (7) officers had drawn their weapons before physical contact. Four (4) of these put the loaded weapon on the ground while actively struggling to free up their hand and more effectively engage the suspect, and the other three (3) officers were still fighting over the weapon when the exercise was stopped for safety reasons. These three may have fired if left to struggle longer.
- Five (5) officers never drew their firearms. They immediately went hands-on after determining the subject had no visible weapon..
- Officers’ attention during the task of controlling the attacker resulted in losing track of the spouse and, in some cases, not perceiving that the spouse was physically pulling on them until the officer’s actions were severely impeded by those efforts. Of note, the spouse only attacked officers when there was not an active struggle over a firearm.
- When the officers grounded their weapons, the spouse had an unimpeded opportunity to pick up and use them. In all cases of ground fighting, the spouse had the opportunity to kick or punch officers in the head or otherwise interfere with them. By design, this alternative was not utilized.
For the 19 officers who had their weapons drawn prior to contact, the inability to holster their weapon would likely prohibit safe access to a less-lethal option or its effective deployment. Importantly, officers’ attention was overwhelmingly consumed by efforts to not lose their weapon; in a real-world setting, transitioning to a second tool while unable to secure the first would dangerously expose the officer to disorienting or disabling blows. It would also introduce another weapon vulnerable to being taken by an attacker.
The problem with drawn weapons under pressure
This training illustrated that the officers who participated were much more skilled at quickly producing a firearm than they were at quickly securing it in the holster. Officers who attempted to holster could not do so rapidly or effectively as the threat advanced on them. The ensuing attack led them to abandon the task altogether.
This is consistent with my observations over 20 years of being a firearms and defensive tactics instructor; accessing a firearm is much faster than securing it, especially under stress. This is likely the result of the draw stroke being a part of the timed course of fire for qualification, and that re-holstering is seldom even evaluated by instructors. There are arguments to be made about why re-holstering quickly may not be an essential skill, but those are not addressed here.
Importantly, deficiencies in skilled strategies for weapons retention and what can be termed “skilled” defensive tactics were the norm. More precisely, there were deficiencies in effective physical skills for stopping a determined attack when the firearm failed to do what officers anticipated it would (stopping the attacker with a hit), or when they chose not to use deadly force because the approaching threat was unarmed but still had an unholstered firearm.
What NYPD training reveals about risk proximity
Indeed, in a review of the NYPD firearm’s training (Rostker, et al., 2008), while dated, officers were explicitly informed of the dangers associated with using a firearm as a threat to gain control/compliance of an unarmed suspect: If an offender who is being held at gunpoint by an officer who has come too close to him or her decides to forcibly resist the officer, he or she has a great advantage over the officer. Such an offender has both hands free to overpower the officer, but one of the officer’s hands — almost always the stronger hand — is tied up in trying to safeguard the weapon. It is nearly impossible for officers who are handicapped in this way to overcome such a suspect, and, if they fail to overcome them, either officer or suspects become victims of shootings that should not have happened. (NYPD Police Academy, 2007a, p. 18)
The training conducted supports this line of reasoning, as four officers felt compelled to abandon their weapons to fight more effectively. Overall, a drawn firearm hindered officer efforts to control the subject, but these went so far as to put a loaded firearm on the ground to focus on physical control. It is a recent illustration of how a weapon in hand dramatically reduces the ability to control or “overcome” a suspect.
For this reason, the NYPD recruits were taught, “except in the most extreme circumstances, officers who are holding drawn firearms should never come within striking distance of suspects. Instead, officers who are holding drawn firearms should keep a safe distance away — 10 feet or more” (NYPD Police Academy, 2007a, p. 18). This is consistent with past firearms training in some jurisdictions; specifically, to shoot an advancing, unarmed threat when that threat came within ten feet of an officer who was holding an unholstered weapon (personal communication with T. Kipps, July 2023). Of course, the threat to the officer still had to be objectively reasonable, but the weapon availability and inability to secure it quickly added to that calculus. Of note, during the training outlined above is that even 15 feet did not provide enough time for officers to securely holster their weapons, and the attacker was not approaching as fast as he could.
Can you shoot before contact? No clear guidance
In speaking to local, state and federal firearm instructors over many years, I have not gleaned any clear or consistent practical guidance as to whether an officer, with a firearm in hand, can shoot an approaching, unarmed threat at close range but before physical contact is made. The equivocation and disparate responses from instructors suggest that a “reasonable” response to this scenario may have wide margins, even as an academic exercise. The wide margins are what make this type of training and the resulting discussions with the participants so valuable. If an officer has first-hand training experience of the dangers associated with subduing a violent attacker while holding a weapon, they are likely better prepared to handle such an incident or to decide when to display their firearm. Additionally, they are better able to explain how the related training informed their actions to a force review board or in a courtroom.
Memory, perception and the stress of fast decisions
Any shooting of an unarmed person will be dissected in its aftermath, making the ability of the officer to articulate their actions essential. Importantly, a person’s recollection of an event — their perception of threat and need for a particular level of force at the time that force was applied — may be at odds with a video recording of the event. In the training above, one very competent officer did not realize he had shot the attacker three times before contact was made until he watched the video. Officer X believed he fired only after contact was made by the attacker. Moreover, his memory of his actions was starkly different from the video of the event. When shown the video after his debrief, he told trainers that he would not have believed that the person in the video was him.
Initiating and not remembering the timing of defensive behaviors is not unique in fast-moving and emotionally charged training or real-world interactions but is of enormous importance for evaluating perceptions which drive, and memory of, force events, as greater stress and complexity of the visual scene lend themselves to increased disparities between memories of an event and video of the event. Of note is that Officer X is the one who applied the skilled takedown-to-cuffing sequence in the training, which suggests that even those with high-level skills are not immune from the impact of perceptual/memory inconsistencies during force events, even in a training environment. As importantly, it illustrates that skilled officers can engage in reflexive defensive actions to a perceived threat. Reflexive for this purpose means that an action is not the product of active deliberation or the result of the careful weighing of alternative strategies — it is an action which is seemingly automatically initiated in response to a threat.
Debriefing officers following high-intensity training routinely illustrates that even stress produced in a training environment can have a significant impact on perceptions and memory — important information for the officer, supervisors, prosecutors, and the public. Multiple people on a scene will experience an event differently based on the perspective of the viewer, their focus of attention, and the level of stress they are experiencing. As a real-life example, remember a time when watching a sporting event where you recognized opportunities that the participant on the field or court did not, although they are more skilled and train far more frequently than the observer.
The perceptions and recollections of a spectator versus the perceptions and recollections of a participant in a fast-moving event can be very different. A quarterback may throw an interception because he does not read a defense correctly, while an observer — from a different perspective, not under time pressure to perform an action under threat of violent contact — easily identifies the defensive scheme and effortlessly produces an array of action choices that would have prevented the interception. This is a serious concern with post-event analysis: knowing the outcome lends itself to identifying where the “critical” mistake or “sequential errors” were made, rather than trying to understand and give due deference to the perspective of the decision-maker on scene. Such calculus must include “automatic” responses, which are a part of the human condition.
Critical skills for officers who choose not to shoot
Given the original training scenario, if a decision is made not to shoot, there are critical skills that are necessary for a successful outcome. These skills include maintaining control of the weapon by denying access to it, creating or taking space to re-holster or minimize damage, and stopping further attacks. These skills are critical because presenting a weapon that does not deter an advancing unarmed threat reduces officer options for defending themselves by limiting non-lethal response choices and making any potential struggle more dangerous. The NYPD firearm’s training review mentioned above also addresses this dynamic: Such situations — a suspect is being held at gunpoint — greatly increase the chances of accidental or unintended shootings. Should suspects make some unanticipated movement — like turning to explain themselves, reaching for their identification, slipping, or tripping — officers are likely to be startled and to pull their triggers. Should suspects try to forcibly resist, the chances of an accidental shooting that will strike the suspect, an officer, or a bystander are increased significantly. (NYPD Police Academy, 2007a, p. 18)
The ability to rapidly holster or retain and fight while holding a pistol is just as important as a rapid draw, because if an officer resorts to muzzle strikes or “pistol whipping” someone, it will be evaluated in the same way as choosing to shoot. Slamming a fully loaded Glock 17, weighing just over two pounds, into someone’s head is, in use of force evaluation, equivalent to striking them in the head with an expandable baton, which weighs just 20 ounces — and would most likely be considered deadly force.
Officers should be able to articulate the force they use based on a realistic understanding of personal knowledge, skills, and abilities. They should also understand the context in which the force was used, as learned in training and real-world encounters. These include:
- That officers have been killed by “unarmed” attackers;
- There is a risk of losing their firearm and having that firearm used against them;
- Shooting an attacker does not guarantee that an attack will stop;
- A subject that is not deterred by a pointed firearm and ignores commands while closing the distance on a police officer can readily indicate a level of malicious intent and significant physical danger from the subject;
- An honest appraisal of their competence in meeting the threat by other means;
- Appreciation of the time versus risk of transitioning from one weapon to another, or simply trying to re-holster while exposed to strikes that could disorient or disable the officer;
- An advantage can be conferred to the attacker if the attacker is larger, younger, stronger, more fit, has a lowered perception of pain due to drugs, etc. As such, officers need to be aware of how these characteristics intersect with their ability to prevail in a violent confrontation from personal experience. Such that:
- A weight difference is significant in a violent struggle,
- Endurance/stamina can drive decision-making, e.g., a 55-year-old (physically or actually) and a fit 22-year-old,
- A person’s perception of pain is reduced under stress or when chemically altered (PCP, etc.),
- The rapid onset of exhaustion in a physical confrontation (note: these evolutions lasted less than a minute and left participants spent). - Multiple assailants present a challenging and dangerous threat to safety.
Benefits of realistic training
It is worth taking stock of personal abilities by doing rather than believing. Knowing individual capacity for sustained effort, tolerance for discomfort, ability to recognize when one is legitimately in danger during a physical confrontation, the distance at which one can consistently hit an intended target with a round when the target is moving, in low light, when breathing hard, and other factors are essential inputs for force decisions — including a decision to pull the trigger or inhibit a shot, as the only safe backstop in most environments is the intended target. Absent this level of understanding, one might consider not using a firearm as a deterrent to an unarmed threat or to mere uncertainty on a call.
It has been my observation that having a firearm in hand biases its use. Officers with a firearm in hand have demonstrated during training and on the street that their weapon can be used reflexively when an officer is surprised or driven by a transient sensory impression that would have been resolved more accurately given a fraction of a second more time to process it. Have officers trained for this possibility or have alternative response options been modeled by an instructor?
Realistic training and exposure to response options are important because acute stress changes the way people process information and often drives forward habitual, conditioned, or instinctive defensive responses to address a threat — the most available action choice can be powerfully influenced by brain regions which are concerned with survival (and not necessarily the law). Speaking with prosecutors and officers who experience perceptual distortions (auditory exclusion, tunnel vision) supports that stress changes what and how information is received. These same groups also shoot the “wrong” targets or role-players during training and often cannot explain why. The brutally honest “I don’t know” suggests these were not deliberate choices. Rather, the actions resulted from non-consciously driven defensive behaviors, where regions of the brain which evolved for survival calculated that fast action was more important than waiting for an accurate assessment. It is important to note that more often than not, this type of defensive action can prove to be a reasonable solution to the perceived threat.
The case for full-speed, contact-based training
In my experience, agencies are hesitant to train realistically (full speed with contact) because of the increased potential for injury to officers and the resultant staffing problems. Yet even grade school football teams practice at full speed/contact. How can a profession where a core function requires skilled violence or skilled control of combative subjects not prepare with a similar intensity? While individual officers purport to take pride in their craft, many are hesitant to train this way and tend to avoid or find reasons not to participate (even if they attend) because it is physically and psychologically uncomfortable (they don’t want to get injured and are not confident in their abilities to stay safe), or it may injure their self-esteem by exposing limited competence or ability in front of their peers. More important than egos, however, is that an individual officer who does not know their capability makes themself, their partners, and the public less safe.
Training must match the reality of violence
Even more than individual officers, supervisors tend to find excuses not to participate in tactical or reality-based training. Many are not even required to do so. Yet these administrators will review the actions of those that have taken the training. This is a leadership failure because law enforcement managers must observe what and how their people are being taught as a practical matter and how individual officers in their command are performing. Identifying hesitant, reluctant, or over-aggressive performers presents an opportunity for additional training, which can improve officer confidence and increase competence in some, while tempering agency “stress grenades” which may prevent higher levels of force during future encounters. Importantly, engaging in training can remind supervisors who have not had a use of force for years that they may not respond in the way they think they will (if they ever did) — it is a critical reminder for a force evaluation when determining what is and is not reasonable (and if the agency’s policy can realistically be adhered to).
Confidence and competence in one’s ability to handle potential use of force incidents is likely to improve the outcome of those events and may even prevent a use of force altogether, reducing stress and legal involvement. This is important because prosecutors and LE may have very different views about when an officer can shoot an unarmed person — even when that person is actively attacking an officer who has an unholstered weapon.
For this reason, officers must critically evaluate if having a weapon out while clearing a house for a “possible” B&E makes sense or presents more of a danger to an officer or an unarmed person they may encounter. Is this inherently more dangerous than when first approaching a car on a traffic stop? An officer should only unholster their weapon when they have good cause to believe the use of the weapon may be immediately necessary, because weapons are more easily produced than secured and make all non-shooting options more dangerous. Are you safer with your weapon out or with both hands available for defensive options if surprised/closed on quickly by an unarmed person who you determine does not pose an immediate deadly threat? Or does an unholstered weapon drive the deadly threat determination?
One officer who participated in the scenario-based training mentioned that he had not participated in this type of at-speed, stress-inducing training in 20 years and that it was eye-opening. This highlights the importance of ongoing, realistic training for officers. Most importantly, the training illustrated the difficulty/danger in defending against an unarmed attacker while holding a weapon, as well as the difficulty in securing it under threat. An important bit of information when an officer first chooses to unholster their weapon.
What realistic training reveals
Realistic training gives officers and administrators valuable insight into behaviors more likely to be realized during a real-world encounter. It exposes individual and agency-wide abilities and training needs. Further, it is essential information for an officer’s decision-making if they find themselves in the same or similar circumstances in the field. It gives an officer insight into their strength, stamina, actual skill level in defensive tactics (what a person does under stress, not what they “think” they will do or what they were “trained” to do), decision-making processes (or lack thereof), and information essential for use of force decision-making.
At the very least, engaging in realistic training is essential to understanding individual capabilities and informing real-world decision-making. It has been theorized that the fight, flight, and freeze defensive behaviors have evolved to give an organism the best chance of survival, even if those behaviors are at odds with what a contemporary person has been “trained” to do or what they think they will do under threat. These are often very different things. Realistic training can provide an officer with more confidence and practical solutions, help to reduce a fear response and enhance decision-making, and improve outcomes for force events. Improving outcomes should be the focus of every agency.
Author’s note: Three months after this training was conducted, an officer from a neighboring jurisdiction found himself in a fight against a determined, drug-fueled assailant. The officer successfully shot the attacker, but that did not stop the assault. The officer was unable to subdue or disengage from the attacker or secure his handgun. The officer was disarmed and killed with his own weapon. Be safe.
NEXT: In the first of a seven-part Policing Matters Roll Call series on use of force, host Jim Dudley engages with Jamie Borden from Critical Incident Review. Borden offers invaluable insights into the before, during, and after stages of critical incidents, shedding light on the decision-making processes of officers and the challenges they face. This dialogue delves into the adequacy of current training standards, the reality of expertise in high-stress situations, and the importance of self-investment for law enforcement professionals.
