The following alert was issued to all law enforcement agencies and members of corporate security by the FBI’s New York office, for the purpose of tightening security and preparing for potential attacks:
A particularly frightening terrorist attack was recently averted, thanks to the last-minute cold feet of one of the participants.
A female Palestinian terrorist gave herself up to Israeli security forces, saying that she was part of a plan to perpetrate a two-stage attack. Two terrorists were to blow themselves up on a bus in central Israel, and then she - dressed as a Magen David Adom (a Red Cross counterpart) emergency medical volunteer - was to blow herself up amidst the rescue personnel who were to arrive on the scene.
The woman was indicted this week in an IDF military court.
This attack is not the first instance of terrorist groups using or attempting to use multiple suicide attacks to target first responders, but it is particularly telling since the woman nearly succeeded in a country that is openly aware of these issues.
Israel’s Magen David Adom is the expected presence on the scene immediately after terrorist attacks. The group handles ambulances and paramedics and coordinates with the national police and local hospitals.
Members of the Magen David Adom respond within 10 minutes of an attack.
They are expected to be there, but consider this: are their faces known? Is time taken to insure the responders are who they seem?
This attack highlights the vulnerability of all first responders, and begs the question, how can the identity of those entering a crime scene be confirmed? The stress and reactions of the first few minutes leaves little time for detailed identification. Yet, how often are uniforms accepted as an assurance, a given.
First responders know, but need to be reminded: don’t take uniforms for granted. At a basic level, how does law enforcement and security insure that the need to check for picture identification and the need to wear it at all times are adhered to automatically? Stopping a suicide attacker is nearly impossible, however, furthering the aftermath of an attack can be limited.
The possibility of suicide operations in the United States is real and requires a different mindset on law enforcement’s and corporate security’s parts. Responders must be made aware of the risks and be ready to change their collective behavior. The alert recommends the following:
- The best initial response is observation
- Know your team: require picture identifications from all responders
- Implement 100% identification checks
- The possibility of booby traps in the aftermath of an attack must be taken into account
- Vehicles should be prevented from directly passing checkpoints
The FBI suggests that agencies and corporate security discuss this issue and put together an operational plan to prepare for and respond to attacks on first responders.
The most important thing for first responders to any type of attack or natural disaster is “awareness”.
This alert can be shared with private security, medical personnel, and other law enforcement agencies who would respond to an attack on a critical infrastructure asset within your area of responsibility.
Source: FBI; Member Submission