This article is part of the Police1 Innovation Report, which examines how emerging technologies are reshaping law enforcement operations and leadership decision-making.
The first units arrive at a fast-moving incident with working radios, a shared talkgroup and access to mobile data. Yet police are looking for a threat, firefighters are sizing up hazards, EMS is planning patient care, 911 is still collecting calls and emergency management is thinking about the next operational period. Everyone can communicate, but they may not be acting from the same facts.
That gap often begins before responders arrive. Brian Tegtmeyer, coordinator of the National 911 Program, said call takers frequently develop important context through structured protocols, follow-up questions and experience. The initial dispatch may launch the right resources, but additional details entered into computer-aided dispatch (CAD) do not always reach every field user, or may not be important enough to interrupt radio traffic at that moment.
The problem intensifies during a major event. Information can arrive faster than a center can synthesize it, and several telecommunicators may handle separate calls about the same incident. Staffing matters: Tegtmeyer noted that 30% of the nation’s 911 centers have two positions or fewer, and 70% have five or fewer. A solo telecommunicator answering calls while dispatching police, fire and EMS cannot be expected to capture, reconcile and rebroadcast every detail in real time.
The details behind the first dispatch
Chris Lombard, vice chair of SAFECOM and chair of the IAFC Communications Committee, described 911 call screening as a race to obtain the minimum information needed to make a dispatch decision. Law enforcement needs threat and officer-safety information; fire and EMS initially need enough to select resources. Meanwhile, the call continues, and new facts emerge.
Multiple callers create another layer. A freeway crash, shooting or house fire may generate 20 or 30 calls. The volume itself can be useful, suggesting the event’s visibility, scale or number of witnesses, and later callers may add a better suspect description, a second location or a new hazard. Yet the first units are already moving, and neither the call count nor every fragment of context is routinely passed along.
Next Generation 911 should improve location data and enable voice, text, images, video and other data to enter the emergency communications center. But Lombard cautioned that much of the discussion has focused on getting richer information into 911, not moving it all the way to the police officer, firefighter or EMT. Tegtmeyer likewise noted that NG911 deployment remains uneven and that standards do not guarantee every vendor interprets or implements them in the same way.
Connected systems, disconnected operations
CAD-to-CAD exchange remains inconsistent. A state patrol center may receive a call on an interstate, then transfer it to local police or fire using another CAD platform. If the systems do not exchange records cleanly, a person must re-enter or relay information. GIS boundaries and location labels may not align. The same resource can be described differently across disciplines, and agency-specific codes can be meaningless to a partner.
A shared radio system does not solve those differences. Tegtmeyer pointed to the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum, which treats technology as only one of five elements; the others are governance, standard operating procedures, training and exercises, and routine use. Agencies also need agreements that define who leads, how information is confirmed, and which channels or applications will be used. If responders only use an interoperability tool during a major incident, Lombard said, familiarity with the tool and awareness of its limitations can fade. Regular use reveals those limitations before lives depend on it.
A “common operating picture” should not be confused with an identical screen. Police, fire, EMS and emergency management legitimately need different views because their missions and time horizons differ. Lombard warned against treating interoperability as something that can be bought off the shelf. The goal is a shared set of validated essential information — locations, hazards, people at risk, resource status, command structure and changes in conditions — presented in ways each discipline can act on.
Assign responsibility without slowing the response
Who validates new information? In the first minutes, there is no single perfect answer. The 911 center should identify the source, distinguish reported facts from confirmed facts, associate updates with the correct incident and push safety-critical changes. Dispatch supervisors can reconcile duplicate calls and conflicting reports when staffing permits. Once command is established, the incident commander owns the operational picture and should designate communications and information-management roles as the incident grows.
Field responders still share responsibility. Lombard said responders must accept that rapidly delivered information may be incomplete or later disproved. He would rather give an incident commander more information, clearly qualified, than withhold it: commanders can discount information they have, but cannot act on information they never receive. Verification, therefore, is a continuing loop among callers, telecommunicators, field units and command — not a one-time gate at dispatch.
Put urgency on the radio; move detail by data
Channel choice should follow urgency, audience and sensitivity. Immediate threats, evacuation orders, mayday traffic, suspect movement and changes that affect every unit belong on the radio because responders cannot be expected to look at a screen during a critical task. Lengthy descriptions, maps, images, call narratives and reference material are better suited to CAD, mobile data terminals or secure shared applications.
Legal and privacy requirements also matter. Lombard noted that criminal justice information and protected health information may require secure data paths or encrypted systems rather than an open radio channel. Agencies should plan primary, alternate, contingency and emergency methods so a failed cellular link, CAD outage or coverage dead spot does not end information flow.
The remedy is not more radio traffic. It is disciplined information management: agreed terminology, interoperable data, clear ownership, source labeling, practiced backup paths and exercises that force agencies to reconcile conflicting reports. The measure of interoperability is not whether everyone can key a microphone. It is whether the right people receive the right facts, understand their confidence and can turn them into coordinated action.
Source note: Interviews with Brian Tegtmeyer and Chris Lombard. Tegtmeyer’s comments reflect his career experience and not an official U.S. Department of Transportation position.