In 2019, four Austin (Texas) Police Department police officers, including Officer Christopher Taylor, responded to a 911 call from a condo building.
Upon arrival, officers were informed that Mauris DeSilva, a condo resident, had been roaming the halls with a knife at his throat threatening suicide. Condo officials, aware that DeSilva suffered from schizophrenia and other mental health issues, told officers that this was not the first such incident. They said DeSilva was on the fifth floor, with a large kitchen knife and was walking toward the elevator. The officers took the elevator directly to the fifth floor.
When the elevator door opened, bodycam footage showed DeSilva near the elevator door, holding a knife to his throat, while facing a hallway mirror. Before the officers could exit the elevator, DeSilva turned toward them. All four officers shouted commands including “Show me your hands” and “Drop the knife.” DeSilva lowered the knife to his side and began to advance toward the officers.
When DeSilva failed to obey, two officers, including Officer Taylor, discharged their firearms. Taylor fired five shots and the other officer fired twice. DeSilva died at the scene. Taylor was subsequently indicted for deadly conduct with a firearm in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.05(b)(1) and § 22.05(c). Taylor pleaded not guilty and asserted as a defense, self-defense and defense of his fellow officers.
The conviction of Officer Taylor
The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found Taylor guilty of deadly conduct with a firearm. Fellow officers testified that they would have responded similarly under the circumstances. A defense expert also testified that a person armed with a knife and positioned within 21 feet could reach and injure an officer before the officer had time to fire, and concluded that Taylor’s use of deadly force was justified. [1] The jury nevertheless returned a guilty verdict. The Austin Police Department’s Special Investigations Unit had previously concluded that Taylor’s conduct did not warrant criminal charges. Taylor was sentenced to two years in prison. [2]
The decision of the Texas Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the jury finding of guilty against Taylor and acquitted him. At the outset, the court outlined the issue before them by stating, “When an elevator door opens to reveal a man holding a knife who turns toward officers and advances, may an officer reasonably believe deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent murder?” [3]
The court observed that during trial, Taylor argued that he acted pursuant to Texas law in self-defense and the defense of others when he used deadly force against DeSilva. The court reviewed the Texas deadly force self-defense statute (§ 9.31(a)) during its analysis of Taylor’s conduct. The court observed that in this statute, “The force used may be deadly force ‘when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. (§ 9.31(a)(A). [4]
The court stated that its examination of Taylor’s self-defense claim must focus on “what the evidence showed at the instant [Taylor] discharged his service weapon and whether the State disproved [his] justifications beyond a reasonable doubt.” [5]
The court observed that the State, in its effort to defeat the self-defense claim, emphasized trial testimony of another officer who stated that DeSilva only took one or two steps toward them rather than an aggressive rush. Moreover, the State argued that the officers could have used alternative tactics to avoid the shooting, including using the stairs in lieu of the elevator, waiting for a trained mental health detective, or physically overpowering DeSilva.
The court rejected the State’s attempt to justify the jury verdict and stated, “[D]ifferent decisions could have been made. But “could have,” “would have,” and “should have” do not disprove justification [i.e. self-defense] beyond a reasonable doubt. Tactical misjudgments, hindsight critiques, or failures to optimally respond to a mental health crisis do not render an otherwise reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force unreasonable.” [6]
The court ruled in favor of Taylor and explained: “The body-worn camera footage shows officers confined inside an elevator as the doors open onto a hallway. DeSilva is initially facing a mirror with a knife to his own throat. When the doors open, DeSilva turns toward the officers, reorients the knife away from himself and toward them, and advances in their direction. The officers have no meaningful avenue of retreat or ability to create distance … A four-inch knife wielded, at that distance, presents an immediate and potentially lethal threat.” [7]
| RELATED: Texas board reinstates LE license for officer acquitted of deadly conduct in fatal shooting
Conclusion
Officer Taylor was most fortunate to be working in a state where the judiciary takes a realistic view of the danger officers face during street confrontations. Unfortunately for Taylor, he was indicted for the crime of deadly conduct with a firearm. The case was brought before the grand jury by Travis County District Attorney Jose Garza.
After the judgment of acquittal in this case, the Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas (CLEAT), a law enforcement union, issued a statement highly critical of the District Attorney. The statement included this language: “The blatant attack on Officer Taylor and the law enforcement profession as a whole by a Soros-funded, [8] anti-police district attorney … is … a deliberate, politically motivated assault on our men and women in blue who answer calls from the public and keep them safe and out of harm’s way.” [9]
According to CLEAT Executive Director Robert Leonard, the Texas statute used to charge Taylor, “had never been used against a law enforcement officer in its decades long existence until the defund the police movement swept our country.” [10]
It should be noted that Taylor was prosecuted pursuant to a law that provided no exception or consideration for officers that use deadly force in defense of themselves or others. In other words, Taylor was prosecuted as an ordinary citizen. In the Taylor decision, the court mentioned in a footnote that the Texas legislature had amended Taylor’s charging statutes to include language favorable to law enforcement officers. [11] These favorable changes were of no benefit to Taylor because his incident happened before the law was amended.
Because some district attorneys choose to criminally charge officers who have used deadly force in life-threatening situations, I recommend that police chiefs’ associations, police unions and police attorneys contact appropriate legislative representatives to request statutory language that addresses law enforcement officers who use deadly force while on duty.
The statutory standard for prosecuting law enforcement officers in state criminal murder and related cases should parallel the constitutional standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. [12] That standard asks whether the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that he or she faced a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others.
This constitutional standard for police use of deadly force has been applied in hundreds of civil lawsuits involving officers in federal and state courts across the nation. Without such a statutory revision, an officer could potentially be convicted of murder despite having acted within the limits of the U.S. Constitution. This should never happen.
References
1. Christopher Taylor v. State of Texas, Texas Court of Appeals, Seventh District, (No. 07-25- 00010-CR) (12/30/2025).
2. Officer Taylor was out on bond pending resolution of his appeal.
3. Id., footnote one.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See New York Post, “Crime Victims aim to topple woke Soros-backed DAs in California, Texas.”, Mary Kay Linge, 5/11/24.
9. CLEAT News Release, December 31, 2025.
10. CLEAT News Release, December 31, 2025.
11. The Legislature recently amended this statute to give protections to peace officers from this statute. Effective September 1, 2025, “[t]he presumption under this subsection does not apply to a peace officer engaged in the lawful discharge of the officer’s official duties” and subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a peace officer if he “(1) was engaged in the actual discharge of the officer’s official duties; and (2) reasonably believed the discharge of the officer’s firearm was justified under Chapter 9 [of the Texas Penal Code].” § 22.05 (c), (f) (West 2025) [Act of June 17, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1146 (S.B. 1637), § 1]. However, the offense took place in 2019, and Appellant was not entitled to receive the benefit of these amendments.
12. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
